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PUNISHING CRIMINALS FOR THEIR CONDUCT: 
A RETURN TO REASON FOR THE ARMED 





For over twenty-five years, the Armed Career Criminal Act has 
produced inconsistent results and has taxed judicial economy perhaps more 
than any other federal sentencing mechanism. This recidivist sentencing 
enhancement is meant to punish habitual criminals based on their 
numerous past crimes, but the Supreme Court’s application of the Act too 
often allows habitual criminals to escape the intended enhancement on a 
legal technicality. This comes as a result of the Court’s categorical 
approach, which punishes habitual criminal offenders based on the 
statutory elements of their past crimes rather than the conduct of their past 
crimes.  
In an effort to find solutions for this ailing doctrine, this Article analyzes 
how states have structured their own recidivist sentencing laws to avoid the 
same problems wreaking havoc in the federal courts. Of all the state 
approaches, a conduct-based approach is most promising because of its 
practical application and ideological consistency. Moreover, the many 
roadblocks articulated by the Court over the years that have supposedly 
prevented it from taking a conduct-based approach are overcome after 
considering the constitutional and practical sentencing landscape.  
I. Introduction 
Mathis v. United States,
1
 the Supreme Court’s latest foray into its Armed 
Career Criminal Act (ACCA or “Act”)
2
 jurisprudence, has become the apex 
of the doctrine’s problematic approach to sentencing habitual criminal 
offenders.  
                                                                                                                 
 * B.A., University of Southern California, 2008; J.D., University of Chicago, 2012. 
The author would like to thank Jayeeta Kundu and John O’Hara for their valuable insights 
into this Article, as well as the Legal Scholarship Workshops at the University of Chicago 
Law School and the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.  
 1. 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016).  
 2. 18 U.S.C. 924(e) (2012). 
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The Mathis case began in small-town Iowa, where panic swept over a 
family when their teenage boy went missing.
3
 Little did they know at the 
time that he had been lured to run away to a middle-aged, repeat criminal 
offender’s house via online chats.
4
 This man with the checkered past, 
Richard Mathis, forcibly molested the boy and intended to do the same to 
two other young boys staying in the house during the same time.
5
 When 
police tracked the victim’s phone to Mathis’s house and eventually 
executed a search warrant, they found a cell phone with sexually explicit 
messages Mathis had sent to other young boys and a memory card 
containing child pornography.
6
 In addition, law enforcement officers found 
a loaded rifle, which Mathis was not allowed to possess as a previously 
convicted felon.
7
 Needless to say, this was only Mathis’s latest criminal 
episode, one more to add to a long list of prior convictions and arrests; in 
addition to five past burglary convictions,
8
 Mathis also had a troubling 
history of sexually abusing young boys.
9
 
The ACCA was meant for habitual offenders like Mathis. The ACCA is 
a federal sentencing enhancement designed to punish felons more severely 
if they have three previous convictions for “violent felonies.”
10
 Burglary 
convictions, of which Mathis had many, are specifically referred to in the 
Act as violent felonies.
11
 Thus, in Mathis’s case, the government decided to 
forego child molestation charges and instead charged Mathis with being a 
felon in possession of a firearm
12
—a crime which, combined with his 
previous Iowa burglary convictions, triggered the ACCA sentencing 
enhancement. Mathis pleaded guilty and the district court later applied the 
ACCA, sentencing Mathis to 180 months of imprisonment.
13
 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Mathis v. United States, 786 F.3d 1068, 1070 (8th Cir. 2015), rev'd, 136 S. Ct. 2243 
(2016). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id.  
 8. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2234, 2246 (2016).  
 9. Brief of Appellee at 21-22, Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068 (No. 14-2396). 
 10. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). 
 11. Id. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
 12. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1070. The jockeying between the Missouri government—which 
could have charged Mathis with more substantive crimes related to sexual abuse of minors—
and the federal government cannot be discerned from the record. It is likely that Missouri 
deferred to the federal government’s prosecution given its greater resources and stronger 
sentencing standards.  
 13. Id. at 1070–71. 
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Unfortunately, the Supreme Court found that the ACCA’s increased 
punishment should not apply to Mathis because of a legal technicality. The 
Supreme Court decided many years ago that a categorical approach was the 
best way to determine whether a prior state conviction for burglary 
qualified as a “burglary” for purposes of the ACCA.
14
 Under the categorical 
approach, sentencing judges cannot look to the offender’s conduct for the 
prior burglary; rather, judges may only consider whether the elements of the 
state burglary statute sufficiently coincide with the elements of the Court’s 
own generic definition of burglary.
15
 If the elements do coincide, the past 
burglary will qualify as a predicate offense to be counted towards the three 
violent felonies necessary to apply the ACCA. If, however, the elements of 
the state burglary statute do not match up, or if the state statute criminalizes 
conduct that is broader than generic burglary, the past burglary will not 
count as a predicate offense. Notably, if the state burglary statute presents 
alternative sets of elements, courts may use a modified categorical 
approach, examining the record of conviction to discern under which set of 
elements the offender was convicted.
16
  
In Mathis, explored further below, the Supreme Court overturned the 
district court’s application of the ACCA because the Iowa burglary statute, 
under which Mathis was convicted, criminalized conduct outside of the 
Court’s narrow generic burglary definition. Mathis’s case is no isolated 
incident. The categorical approach has been used for over a half-century in 
criminal and immigration contexts, and often works in favor of the 




If this categorical approach seems confusing, that’s because it is. 
Commentators have referred to this doctrine as “an inconsistent patchwork 
of decisions,”
18
 and even likened it to the rule against perpetuities “in terms 
                                                                                                                 
 14. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600–02 (1990). 
 15. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2245 (2016). As the Supreme Court has 
found, elements, which “are the constituent parts of a crime’s legal definition [that] must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction, . . . are distinct from ‘facts,’ 
which are mere real-world things” that are “extraneous to the crime’s legal requirements.” 
Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939) 
(Hand, J.) (recognizing that many immigrants who have committed serious offenses avoid 
deportation because of the categorical approach’s focus on elements of an offense, rather 
than the facts of the offender’s actual conduct). 
 18. Ted Koehler, Note, Assessing Divisibility in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1521, 1523 (2012); see also Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 150 (2008) 
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of its complexity . . . . ‘Even lawyers who regularly practice [criminal law] 
can struggle to understand the doctrine and its occasionally perplexing 
results.’”
19
 Judges have lamented over the categorical approach doctrine as 
well, with one court going so far to say that in the twenty years since the 
adoption of the categorical approach, it “has struggled to understand the 
contours of the Supreme Court’s framework.”
20
 
Even more fundamental than the categorical approach’s confusing 
application are its ideological constraints. A “big drawback of the 
categorical approach is that it cuts against the grain of our intuitions about 
rough justice. . . . This last point cannot be stressed enough. The categorical 
approach is completely insensitive to what happened here.”
21
 Common 
sense and legal theory both tell us that offenders should be punished for 
their conduct. For example, if a burglar enters someone’s home and steals 
thousands of dollars of possessions, he or she should be punished for his or 
her specific crimes. The categorical approach applied by the Supreme 
Court, however, divorces what a habitual offender actually did from the 
punishment they are meant to receive.  
The practical and ideological problems presented by the categorical 
approach have in turn increasingly taxed judicial economy. Judges have 
rightfully complained that “[t]he dockets of . . . all federal courts are now 
clogged with [ACCA] cases,”
22
 and that “no other area of the law has 
demanded more of [the courts’] resources.”
23
 The very architect of the 
ACCA himself, the late Senator Arlen Specter, expressed his 
disappointment with the “costly and time-consuming [ACCA] litigation at 
every level of the Federal court system.”
24
 With nearly ten percent of 
                                                                                                                 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (describing ACCA doctrine as “piecemeal, suspenseful, [and] 
Scrabble-like”).  
 19. Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803, 1834 (2013) 
(quoting Doug Keller, Causing Mischief for Taylor’s Categorical Approach: Applying 
“Legal Imagination” to Duenas-Alvarez, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 625, 625 (2011)). 
 20. United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 917 (9th Cir. 2011), 
abrogated by Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
 21. Evan Lee, Regulating Crimmigration 23 (Univ. of Cal. Hastings Coll. of Law, 
Research Paper No. 128, 2015).  
 22. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 787 (4th Cir. 2011) (Agee, J., concurring). 
 23. Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d at 917; see also Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 
33 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (speculating that the Supreme Court would be analyzing 
state law under the ACCA “until the cows come home”). 
 24. 156 CONG. REC. S10,516 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 2010) (statement of Sen. Specter); see 
also Avi M. Kupfer, Note, A Comprehensive Administrative Solution to the Armed Career 
Criminal Act Debacle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 151, 152 (2014).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/3
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federal firearm offenders being sentenced under the ACCA
25
 and an 
estimated 7000 offenders currently serving these sentences,
26
 the strain that 
the categorical approach puts on judicial economy must be addressed.  
Given the doctrine’s well-documented problems, this Article seeks to 
find an efficient and practical replacement that conforms with fundamental 
notions of justice. In order to do so, this Article presents a comprehensive 
look into how the states deal with these same problems in their own 
habitual-offender statutes. Like the federal government’s ACCA, nearly 
every state has sentencing enhancements that increase penalties for habitual 
offenders. Like the ACCA, these state habitual-offender statutes consider 
predicate offenses that offenders committed in other states. Unlike the 
ACCA, however, the states have taken a range of different approaches that 
offer simple application while achieving uniformity. Chief among these 
approaches is a conduct-based approach, which not only conforms with 
common-sense sentencing ideals (punishing criminals based on what they 
actually did), but offers a practical solution to the difficult application of the 
current categorical approach. 
In exploring alternatives to the categorical approach, this Article 
proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the ACCA’s legislative history and 
the roots of the categorical approach in the Court’s jurisprudence. Part III 
explores the ideological and practical tensions of the categorical approach. 
In Part IV, the Article explains and justifies the methodology of analyzing 
state practice to solve the federal categorical approach problem. Then, in 
Part V, this Article explains possible solutions gleaned from the states and 
ultimately argues that a conduct-based approach is the most effective 
change to address the confusion-plagued categorical approach doctrine. 
This Article then offers conclusory remarks by looking to the future and 
commenting on the legal realism behind the Court’s current jurisprudence.  
  
                                                                                                                 
 25. Douglas A. Berman, How Many Hundreds (or Thousands?) of ACCA Prisoners 
Could Be Impacted by a Big Ruling in Johnson?, SENTENCING L. & POL’Y (June 13, 2015 
10:07 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/ how-many-
hundreds-or-thousands-of-acca-prisoners-could-be-impacted-by-a-big-ruling-in-
johnson.html. 
 26. Id.; see also Jessica A. Roth, The Divisibility of Crime, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 95, 97 
n.7 (2015), https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context= 
dlj_online (finding that “approximately 600 criminal defendants per year have been 
sentenced as Armed Career Criminals” under the Act). 
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II. The Roots of the ACCA and the Categorical Approach  
A. The Forgotten Intent of Legislative History  
Habitual-offender laws like the ACCA enjoy a long tradition in this 
country that dates back to colonial times.
27
 Enhancing an offender’s 
sentence based on their criminal history has proved attractive for lawmakers 
both from a policy and political standpoint. The ACCA, for example, was 
championed in the early 1980s in the midst of a heightened fear of drugs 
and crime,
28
 during which time politicians found it expedient to convey a 
toughness on crime. More importantly, however, Congress was motivated 
by criminology research suggesting that a small number of criminals were 
responsible for committing a large percentage of crimes.
29
 Thus, Congress 
believed that it could stymy rising crime rates by incapacitating habitual 
offenders for longer periods of time.  
In the “interest of public safety” and to adequately deal with the rising 
threat of “armed repeat offenders who continue to commit serious 
                                                                                                                 
 27. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992) (“Statutes that punish recidivists more 
severely than first offenders have a long tradition in this country that dates back to colonial 
times.”); see also Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislation and Sentencing Commission 
Objectives, 20 LAW & POL’Y 429, 441 (1998); Krystle Lamprecht, Comment, Formal, 
Categorical, but Incomplete: The Need for a New Standard in Evaluating Prior Convictions 
Under the Armed Carrier Criminal Act, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1407, 1412 (2008). 
 28. Michael Schearer, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Imprecise, Indeterminate, and 
Unconstitutional 3 (Dec. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2698973 (“In the two decades from 1960 to 1980, violent crime 
in the United States rose by an astounding 271%. During the same time period, the burglary 
rate increased by 231% and robbery increased by 318%. Similar increases were noted in 
rates of forcible rape, aggravated assault, property crime, larceny, and motor vehicle theft.”) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 29. United States v. Hawkins, 811 F.2d 210, 216 (3d Cir. 1987) (“Congress enacted the 
Armed Career Criminal provision for the purpose of incapacitating particular repeat 
offenders, who it found were responsible for a large proportion of crimes involving theft and 
violence.”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 20 (1982) (citing evidence that “a small number 
of repeat offenders commit a highly disproportionate amount of the violent crime plaguing 
America today”); see also Schearer, supra note 28, at 4 (citing MARVIN E. WOLFGANG ET 
AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972)) (finding that 6% of a study group was 
responsible for “61% of all homicides, 76% of all rapes, 73% of all robberies, and 65% of all 
aggravated assaults of those crimes perpetrated by members of the group”); id. (citing MARK 
A. PETERSON ET AL., DOING CRIME: A SURVEY OF CALIFORNIA PRISON INMATES xii (1980)) 
(finding that 25% of sampling group of prison inmates were responsible for “58% of all 
armed robberies, 65% of all burglaries, 60% of all motor vehicle thefts, and 46% of all 
assaults of those crimes reported by members of the sample group”).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/3





 Congress explored ways to incapacitate career criminals.
31
 This 
led members of Congress to introduce the ACCA as a three-strikes, strict 
liability law which would have imposed a mandatory life sentence after a 
third armed burglary or robbery.
32
 When Congress rejected this version on 
account of its overly harsh punishment,
33
 then-Senator Arlen Specter 
reintroduced the Act with its now-enacted fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
sentence.
34
 The logic behind this fifteen-year sentence was based on data 
that suggested that criminal careers commonly start at age fifteen and end at 
age thirty.
35
 While this justification is rife with logical problems,
36
 it 
ultimately proved more palatable to Congress than the mandatory life 
sentences imposed by the original bill.  
The ACCA finally became law as one small piece of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984, which has been described as “the most 
extensive change[] ever made to the federal criminal justice system.”
37
 The 
                                                                                                                 
 30. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 7 (1983). 
 31. Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement 
Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1091 n.42 (1988) (quoting 130 CONG. 
REC. H101,551 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1984)) (quoting Rep. Ron Wyden) (“We simply must put a 
stop to the career [criminals] . . . . [W]e all know that a slap on the wrist won’t be enough to 
deter these criminals.”). 
 32. Jenny W.L. Osborne, Comment, One Day Criminal Careers: The Armed Career 
Criminal Act’s Different Occasions Provision, 44 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 963, 967 (2011) 
(citing Career Criminal Life Sentence Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 1688, S. 1689, and S. 1690 
Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Justice of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 
(1982)). 
 33. See infra notes 204–207 and accompanying text. 
 34. Osborne, supra note 32, at 967-68 (citing S. REP. NO. 1688, 97th Cong. (1982)). 
 35. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 77 (1983)) (explaining the rationale behind the 
fifteen-year mandatory minimum). 
 36. Apart from the fact that this statistic has drastically changed since the 1980s, it also 
suffers from inconsistent logic: in order to be eligible for this sentence, a minor at the age of 
fifteen would have already had to commit several crimes. It is likely that by the time this 
habitual offender even qualified for the fifteen-year sentence, he or she would be far into the 
age of maturity. Then, if criminal activity usually ceased at age thirty, most sentences that 
incarcerated criminals past that age would be overly harsh and ineffective. Also, this 
justification did not account for the reality that many offenders would be further hardened 
after fifteen years behind bars. Thus, an offender’s age is not nearly as determinative of 
recidivism as is their past experience and rehabilitation to successfully reenter society with 
the requisite opportunities needed to rebuild a life apart from crime. Nevertheless, these are 
critiques that enjoy the luxury of hindsight, which the politicians in the early 1980s did not 
enjoy. 
 37. Thomas O. Powell, The Armed Career Criminal Act—Proposing a New Test to 
Resolve Difficulties in Applying the Act’s Ambiguous Residual Clause, BEPRESS 1 (Mar. 16, 
2009), https://works.bepress.com/thomas_powell/1/download/. 
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nuts and bolts of the ACCA mandated a fifteen-year mandatory minimum 
prison term for offenders found guilty of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm
38




The 1984 version of the law had a narrow scope and was only to be 
applied to a “very small portion” of “hard core . . . career criminals.”
40
 The 
law enumerated burglaries and robberies as “violent felonies” in part 
because of the frequency of such offenses when compared to more 
egregious violent crimes.
41
 Thus, for the most part, these crimes were 
enumerated as “violent felonies” more because of their frequency than their 
actual violence. Senator Specter, perhaps in hyperbole, also gained traction 
for the law by declaring that “[r]obberies and burglaries are the most 
damaging crimes to society.”
42
 As a result, Congress made it a priority to 
incapacitate habitual property offenders because “in terms of the likelihood 
of being victimized, burglary is the primary threat, followed by robbery.”
43
  
When in committee, the language was amended to maximize this intent. 
The original bill sought to punish burglary and robbery offenses “in 
violation of the ‘statutes’ of the States and the United States,” but the term 
“statute” was replaced by the broader term “laws” “to ensure that all 
conduct which the Committee intended to make punishable under the new 
offense was covered.”
44
 As if peering into a crystal ball, Congress also tried 
to anticipate and fix potential problems that might arise from relying on 
state law to determine ACCA predicates. Congress understood “that 
culpable offenders might escape punishment on a technicality” due to “the 
wide variation among states and localities in the ways that offenses are 
labeled.”
45
 Realizing the potential confusion in application, Congress added 
subsections that clearly defined what constituted predicate burglaries and 
robberies for the Act.
46
 In particular, Congress defined burglary as “any 
offense involving entering or remaining surreptitiously within a building 
                                                                                                                 
 38. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). 
 39. Id. § 924(e)(1). 
 40. Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1411 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-585, at 62-63 (1983)). 
 41. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1984) (“Burglaries are 40 times more common than rapes, 
and robberies are seven times more common than rapes.”); see also Armed Career Criminal 
Act: Hearing on H.R. 1627 and S. 52 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 98th Cong. 6, 33 (1984).  
 42. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 3 (1984). 
 43. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1984). 
 44. Id. at 18. 
 45. Id. at 20. 
 46. Id.  
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that is the property of another with intent to engage in conduct constituting 
a Federal or State offense.”
47
  
Congress’s rationale for adopting these definitions and preventing 
reliance on what a state statute might define as being “burglary” was rooted 
in “fundamental fairness” and uniformity in sentencing habitual offenders 
consistently, no matter the state in which they committed their previous 
offenses. Thus, Congress wanted to acknowledge “the prerogatives of the 
States in defining their own offenses,” but at the same time ensure “that the 
same type of conduct is punishable on the Federal level in all cases.”
48
 This 
made it clear that Congress had drafted the ACCA so that “it would not put 
Federal courts in a position of having to interpret and apply State laws on 
robbery and burglary in Federal criminal trials.”
49
  
Congress was not quite finished tinkering with the ACCA, and passed 
numerous amendments to the Act in 1986 to broaden its application.
50
 
When Senator Specter introduced the amendments, he noted that since the 
sentencing enhancement had been successful with classification of 
burglaries and robberies serving as predicate crimes, “the time has come to 
broaden that definition so that we may have a greater sweep and more 
effective use of this important statute.”
51
  
In an effort to expand the predicate offenses that triggered the higher 
sentence, Congress replaced burglary and robbery crimes with three broad 
categories of offenses. First, Congress added “serious drug trafficking 
offenses,” which were in turn further defined by the statute.
52
 Second, 
Congress added “violent felonies,” which included enumerated offenses 
like burglary, robbery, extortion, and the use of explosives, as well as 
offenses involving physical force against property.
53
 Third, Congress 
sought to include violent felonies that involved the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of violence against a person.
54
 
                                                                                                                 
 47. Id. at 2. 
 48. Id. at 20 (emphasis added). 
 49. H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 5–6 (1984) (emphasis added). 
 50. See The Armed Career Criminal Act Amendments: Hearing on S. 2312 Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 1 (1986) 
(statement of Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (claiming that only 
including burglary and robbery as predicate offenses was too limited, and that the ACCA 
should be amended to include additional predicate offenses). 
 51. 132 CONG. REC. 7697 (1986). 
 52. H.R. REP. No. 99-849, at 3 (1986). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id.  
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Yet another crucial change in 1986, which may have singlehandedly 
created the mire of ACCA jurisprudence, was the deletion of the statutory 
definitions of burglary and robbery.
55
 While the legislative history on the 
deletion of these definitions is silent,
56
 later developments suggest the 
deletion was merely an inadvertent, yet costly, mistake in draftsmanship.
57
 
When then-Senator Joseph Biden introduced a bill in 1989 to address the 
issue, he explained that the bill “corrects an error that occurred 
inadvertently when the definition of burglary was deleted from the Armed 
Career Criminal statute in 1986. The amendment reenacted the original 
definition, which was intended to be broader than common law burglary.”
58
 
The Senate passed the uncontroversial bill 100-0 and then sent it to the 
House, where it never made it past the House desk.
59
 As a result of this 
enduring mistake, courts have had no choice but to give meaning to 
Congress’s omission.
60
 Thus, courts have had to assume that Congress, for 
some unknown reason, meant to leave out the definition of burglary.
61
 
Perhaps the inexcusable inaction of the House, too, can be categorized as an 
“inadvertent mistake” that has now produced one of the most muddled 
criminal sentencing doctrines in American jurisprudence.  
This omission was not the only offense in draftsmanship that has 
contributed to the current mess of ACCA doctrine. In the immediate 
aftermath of the ACCA’s enactment, the language was so poorly drafted
62
 
                                                                                                                 
 55. See Career Criminals Amendment Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, Subtitle I, Sec. 
1402(2), § 924(e)(2), 100 Stat. 3207, 39-40 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) 
(2012)). 
 56. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 582 (1990). 
 57. Id. at 589–90 n.5. 
 58. Id. (quoting 135 CONG. REC. 23519) (statement of Sen. Biden). 
 59. See A Bill to Implement the President’s 1989 Drug Control Strategy, S. 1711, 101st 
Cong. (1989), https://www.congress.gov/bill/101st-congress/senate-bill/1711/all-actions-
without-amendments (showing that the last recorded legislative action for Senate Bill 1711 
was on October 18, 1989, where the record indicates it was being held at the House desk). 
 60. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (“If Congress had 
wanted to increase a sentence based on the facts of a prior offense, it presumably would have 
said so; other statutes, in other contexts, speak in just that way.”); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600–
01; see also Inhabitants of Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883) (stating that 
courts must “give effect . . . to every clause and word of a statute, avoiding, if it may be, any 
construction which implies that the legislature was ignorant” or made a mistake). 
 61. James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 230 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (referring to 
the ACCA as a “drafting failure”), overruled by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 
(2015). 
 62. Rafaloff, supra note 31, at 1090 (citing United States v. Jackson, 824 F.2d 21, 25 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Lamentably, the ACCA . . . was not meticulously drafted . . . .”); see, e.g., 
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that courts could not even agree on whether the Act was a separate federal 
offense or merely a sentencing enhancement to existing offenses.
63
 Soon 
after such problems arose, the Supreme Court stepped in to provide needed 
clarification on the interpretation and application of the Act. Unfortunately, 
over a quarter century later, we are still ironically dealing with the 
additional problems introduced by the Court in its effort to simplify 
interpretation of the ACCA.  
B. From Taylor to Mathis: The Circle of Strife 
“This categorical approach requires courts to choose the right 
category. And sometimes the choice is not obvious.”  
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009). 
1. Taylor and the Categorical Approach 
The Court’s first journey down its rocky jurisprudential path came in 
Taylor v. United States,
64
 in which the Court addressed the Act’s 
application to predicate burglary offenses.
65
 Arthur Lajuane Taylor pleaded 
guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm,
66
 and had a long criminal 
record that included robbery, assault, and two second-degree burglaries in 
Missouri.
67
 In light of his record, the district court ultimately applied the 
ACCA and sentenced Taylor to the fifteen-year mandatory minimum. 
Unfortunately, since Congress had deleted the definition of “burglary” 
from the Act in its 1986 amendments, the lower courts had disagreed on 
how to define the term. The Eighth Circuit upheld the district court’s 
application of the Act because it reasoned that “burglary” should 
correspond with whatever the states label as burglary in their criminal 
code.
68
 If a state defined an offense as burglary, it reasoned, the federal 
courts should defer to this state-law label regardless of the elements of the 
state offense. Other courts reasoned that in the absence of a statutory 
definition, the courts should defer to the common law definition of 
                                                                                                                 
United States v. Rush, 840 F.2d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (finding that the plain 
language and structure of ACCA was inconclusive). 
 63. Rafaloff, supra note 31, at 1087.  
 64. 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 
 65. Id. at 577–78.  
 66. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 
 67. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 578.  
 68. Id. at 579, 580 n.2 (citing United States v. Taylor, 864 F.2d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(defining burglary according to state law), rev’d, 495 U.S. 575 (1990); United States v. 
Leonard, 868 F.2d 1393, 1399 (5th Cir. 1989), abrogated by Taylor, 495 U.S. 575). 
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 Regardless of whether a defendant was convicted of burglary as 
defined by a state’s law, the burglary conviction should only serve as an 
ACCA predicate if it would have been a burglary under the common law. 
Still other courts looked to the Act’s 1984 definition of burglary to 
determine if a state law burglary conviction qualified as a predicate 
offense.
70
 To these courts, it was “not readily apparent whether Congress 
intended ‘burglary’ to mean whatever the State of the defendant’s prior 
conviction defines as burglary, or whether it intended that some uniform 
definition of burglary be applied to all cases in which the Government seeks 
a § 924(e) enhancement.”
71
 
With this disagreement serving as a backdrop, the Supreme Court 
examined the Act’s legislative history and rightly found it “implausible that 
Congress intended the meaning of ‘burglary’ . . . to depend on the definition 
adopted by the State of conviction.” This would mean that a person may or 
may not “receive a sentence enhancement based on exactly the same 
conduct, depending on whether the State of his prior conviction happened 
to call that conduct ‘burglary.’”
72
 Instead, the Court found that Congress 
intended for “the same type of conduct” to be “punishable on the Federal 
level in all cases.”
73
  
Next, the Court sought to establish a uniform definition of burglary to be 
used for purposes of determining predicate offenses under the Act. Citing a 
respected criminal law treatise,
74
 the Court generically defined burglary as 
“having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or 
remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.”
75
 The 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 592, 580 n.2 (citing United States v. Chatman, 869 F.2d 525, 
530 (9th Cir. 1989) (defining burglary according to common law), abrogated by Taylor, 495 
U.S. 575; United States v. Headspeth, 852 F.2d 753, 757 (4th Cir. 1988), abrogated by 
Taylor, 495 U.S. 575). 
 70. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580 n.2 (citing United States v. Palmer, 871 F.2d 1202, 
1205–07 (3d. Cir. 1989) (defining burglary as any offense that would have met the definition 
of burglary under a predecessor statute to § 924(e)); United States v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 
1027–28 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Dombrowski, 877 F.2d 520, 530 (7th Cir. 1989); 
United States v. Hill, 863 F.2d 1575, 1581–82 (11th Cir. 1989)). 
 71. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 580.  
 72. Id. at 590-91.  
 73. Id. at 582 (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 5 (1983)) (emphasis added). 
 74. Id. at 598 (citing 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE 
CRIMINAL LAW § 8.13, at 464 (1st ed. 1986)). 
 75. Id. at 599.  
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Court justified this definition by noting that it was “practically identical to 
the 1984 definition,”
76
 and so was likely in line with congressional intent.  
With this uniform definition in hand, the Court implemented the 
categorical approach. This approach required sentencing courts to compare 
the elements of the prior state criminal offense to the elements of generic 
burglary.
77
 If the elements of the state crime were within or narrower than 
the elements of generic burglary, the crime fit within the category of ACCA 
predicate offenses. If the state crime elements were different or broader 
than the generic offense, the opposite was true. Thus, the Court took a 
slightly unintuitive approach by interpreting a criminal sentencing statute to 
punish a habitual offender based on the elements of his prior offense, as 
opposed to punishing him for the conduct of his prior offense.
78
  
The Court justified its approach by looking to the language of the Act, 
which seemed to place an emphasis on the statutory elements of a prior 
state conviction, rather than the conduct that gave rise to the conviction. 
First, the Court noted that § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) of the Act called for the 
sentence enhancement when a criminal had been convicted of a crime “that 
has as an element—not any crime that, in a particular case, involves—the 
use or threat of force.”
79
 Thus, the Court reasoned that this emphasis on 
elements should bleed into the following subsection that identified burglary 
as a “violent felony” predicate.
80
  
Second, the Court reasoned that Congress intended for courts to look to 
the elements of previous convictions, rather than to the conduct underlying 
those convictions.
81
 The Court’s argument was based on silence, stating that 
“[i]f Congress had meant to adopt an approach that would require the 
sentencing court to engage in an elaborate factfinding process regarding the 
defendant’s prior offenses, surely this would have been mentioned 
somewhere in the legislative history.”
82
 In other words, the Court argued 
that Congress intended a categorical approach based on what it did not say.  
Third, the Court believed that a conduct-based approach would present 
practical difficulties that would require trial courts to undertake 
burdensome fact-finding inquiries to determine the conduct of the prior 
                                                                                                                 
 76. Id. at 598. 
 77. Id. at 600. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) (1988)).  
 80. Id. at 600–01; 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).  
 81. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601. 
 82. Id. 
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 For example, would the record of the previous conviction even 
reveal the offender’s criminal conduct? If not, would the parties have to 
examine witnesses from the prior criminal proceedings to determine the 
facts that gave rise to the previous conviction? If a sentencing court made 
such a determination, would that abridge a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial? Also, if a criminal pleaded guilty to a 
lesser crime than burglary in a previous conviction, would it be fair to hold 
him accountable as having committed burglary if his criminal conduct were 
within the bounds of generic burglary?
84
 While the Court posed these 
questions, it did little to actually answer them. Instead, it used them to 
justify an elements-based, categorical approach as a way of practically 
simplifying the process. After all, what could go wrong when trying to 
determine whether the statutory elements of fifty different state definitions 
of burglary fit within the bounds of the generic limits?  
2. Taylor and the Modified Categorical Approach 
Ironically, just as soon as the Court denounced the practical difficulties 
of delving into the record of prior convictions, it outlined a clear doctrine 
for courts to do just that. The Court realized that there would be some cases 
in which a state criminal statute may sweep more broadly than the narrow 
generic definition of burglary. These “divisible” state statutes presented 
“multiple, alternative versions of the crime.”
85
 By way of example, the 
Court stated that many states’ “burglary statutes . . . define burglary more 
broadly” than the generic definition “by including places, such as 
automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings.”
86
 In this “narrow 
range of cases,” the Court instructed sentencing courts to “look beyond the 
statutory elements [of the prior crime] to ‘the charging paper and jury 
instructions’ used in [the previous criminal proceeding].”
87
 Therefore, when 
a state burglary statute has “alternative elements”— for example, a burglary 
statute that prohibits entry into an automobile as well as a building—the 
sentencing court could use this “modified categorical approach” to look at a 
set of documents from the previous conviction to determine under which 
elements the defendant was actually convicted: the elements that fit within 
the generic burglary of buildings, or the elements that fall outside the 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 601-02. 
 85. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013). 
 86. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. 
 87. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283-84 (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602).  
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generic definition, such as burgling an automobile.
88
 If the former, that 
conviction would count as one of the three necessary predicate offenses to 
apply the sentencing enhancement of the Act; if the latter, the opposite 
would be true.  
After laying out these complex theoretical doctrines, the Court turned 
back to the case at hand. In order for Taylor to be subject to a fifteen-year 
minimum sentence under the Act, he first had to be found guilty of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm in the present case. Second, he had to have 
at least three prior convictions for “violent felonies” as defined by the Act.
89
 
Taylor conceded that his prior convictions for robbery and assault were 
violent felonies, but challenged whether his convictions for burglary should 
be considered violent felonies.
90
 When Taylor was convicted of second-
degree burglary in Missouri, the Missouri Code contained seven different 
second-degree burglary statutes, all of which “varied as to the type of 
structure and the means of entry involved” to be burgled.
91
 After the Court 
employed the modified categorical approach and examined the “sparse 
record,” it could not determine which of the seven statutes served the basis 




3. The Taylor Hypothetical Comes to Life in Shepard  
The next time the Court addressed application of the ACCA was in 
Shepard v. United States,
93
 in which the Court sought to define exactly 
which types of documents courts could rely upon when employing the 
modified categorical approach.
94
 In Shepard, “the hypothetical [the Court] 
posited in Taylor became real”
95
 because the defendant had previously 
pleaded guilty to violating Massachusetts’s burglary statute, which 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. at 2284. 
 89. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012).  
 90. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 579.  
 91. See id. at 578 n.1 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 560.045 (1969) (breaking and entering a 
dwelling house); id. § 560.050 (having entered a dwelling house, breaking out of it); id. §§ 
560.055, 560.060 (breaking an inner door); id. § 560.070 (breaking and entering a building, 
booth, tent, boat, or railroad car); id. § 560.075 (breaking and entering a bank; id. § 560.080 
(breaking and entering a vacant building)).  
 92. Id. at 602. 
 93. 544 U.S. 13 (2005). 
 94. Id. at 16.  
 95. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013) (discussing Shepard).  
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“cover[ed] entries into ‘boats and cars’ as well as buildings.”
96
 Just as the 
Court had contemplated in Taylor:  
No one could know, just from looking at the statute, which 
version of the offense Shepard was convicted of. Accordingly, 
[the Court] again authorized sentencing courts to scrutinize a 
restricted set of materials . . . to determine if the defendant had 




The Court expressly limited these reviewable materials—later called 
Shepard documents—to the “charging document, written plea agreement, 




When the Court limited its inquiry to the Shepard documents, it 
overturned the lower courts’ decision to apply the ACCA to the offender 
because it had relied upon police reports and complaint applications to 
perform the categorical analysis.
99
 Even though the record showed that the 
defendant had never disputed that he indeed broke into a building (which 
would categorically qualify as a predicate ACCA offense), the Court 
nevertheless reversed his sentence based on the technicality of which 




4. The Dicta of Descamps and Its Second Footnote  
The Court continued down this rabbit hole of legal fiction in Descamps 
v. United States,
101
 which introduced yet another level of confusion to the 
categorical approach. In Descamps, the Court held that a prior conviction 
under a California burglary statute
102
 could not serve as an ACCA predicate 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Id. (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 17).  
 97. Id. (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26).  
 98. Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.  
 99. Id. at 18, 26. 
 100. Id. at 23 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990); Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–173 (1989) (commenting on the importance of 
stare decisis, following the doctrine as laid out in Taylor, and noting “[c]onsiderations of 
stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the 
context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress 
remains free to alter what we have done”)). 
 101. 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
 102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (West 2017). 
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because it did not contain a necessary element of generic burglary.
103
 
Whereas generic burglary required “an unlawful entry along the lines of 
breaking and entering,”
104
 the California burglary statute had no such 
“unlawful entry” requirement.
105
 Consequently, because it was unnecessary 
for California to prove that the defendant “broke and entered,” a California 
burglary conviction could not serve as an ACCA predicate.
106
 The Court 
expressly disavowed an analysis of the defendant’s conduct—whether he 
“did break and enter makes no difference.”
107
  
The holding of the case, however, is somewhat inconsequential when 
compared to its dicta, which cleaved a deep circuit split regarding the 
categorical and modified categorical approaches. The Court confirmed that 
the modified categorical approach only comes into play when a statute is 
divisible—that is, when it presents an alternative set of elements of which 
one set corresponds with generic burglary and the other set does not.
108
 
Consequently, a court cannot use the modified categorical approach to 
glean information from prior conviction documents when the convicting 
statute only has one set of indivisible elements.
109
 As it had before,
110
 the 
Court offered as an example of a divisible statute, one that that 
criminalizes assault with any of eight specified weapons; and 
suppose further . . . that only assault with a gun counts as an 
ACCA offense. A later sentencing court need only check the 
charging documents and instructions . . . to determine whether in 
convicting a defendant under that divisible statute, the jury 




In the Court’s second footnote, it responded to a dissent, authored by 
Justice Alito, which raised the issue of whether the Court’s previous 
holdings and examples highlighted different elements, or merely different 
factual means of fulfilling that element.
112
 The Court stated that “if, as the 
                                                                                                                 
 103. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2292–93.  
 104. Id. at 2285 (citing 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 21.1(a) (2d 
ed. 2003)) (emphasis added). 
 105. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 459 (2017)).  
 106. Id. at 2285-86. 
 107. Id. at 2286. 
 108. Id. at 2290.  
 109. Id. 
 110. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).  
 111. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290. 
 112. Id. at 2285 n.5.  
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dissent claims, the state laws at issue in [previous] cases set out ‘merely 
alternative means, not alternative elements’ of an offense, that is news to 
us.”
113
 Further, the Court stated that it could “see no real-world reason to 
worry” about such a distinction because whether a statute lists elements or 
means, the documents approved by the Court in Taylor and Shepard reflect 
the elements of the crime.
114
 The Court instructed that lower courts “need 
not parse state law . . . [but,] [w]hen a state law is drafted in the alternative, 
the court[s] merely resort[] to the approved documents and compare[] the 
elements revealed there to those of the generic offense.”
115
 
The crucial issue the Court failed to address, however, was how to 
determine what is an element and what is a mean. For years, the Court—in 
both Taylor and Shepard—stated that statutes listing alternative places that 
could be burgled (a building or an automobile) were divisible and should be 
subject to the modified categorical approach. In footnote two, the Court  
manufactured doubt as to whether these statutes were truly divisible after 
twenty-five years of jurisprudence suggesting that they were. As a result, 
the courts of appeals quickly split on this very question.
116
  
5. The Circle Is Complete: Mathis Contradicts the Practical Concerns of 
Taylor 
In Mathis, the Court finally resolved the elements versus means 
question; in doing so, it also obliviously contradicted its own decisions in 
Taylor and Shepard. The Court rightfully declared that for twenty-five 
years, its “decisions have held that [a] prior crime qualifies as an ACCA 
predicate if, but only if, its elements are the same as, or narrower than, 
                                                                                                                 
 113. Id. (citing Justice Alito’s dissent). 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1075 n.6 (2015) (comparing United 
States v. Royal, 731 F.3d 333, 341 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Rather than alternative elements, then, 
‘offensive physical contact’ and ‘physical harm’ are merely alternative means of satisfying a 
single element of the Maryland offense.”), and United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 
1348–49 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that a disjunctive “or” statement that listed alternative 
places that could be burgled were “illustrative examples” and not “alternative elements”), 
and Rendon v. Holder, 764 F.3d 1077, 1086 (9th Cir. 2014) (“To be clear, it is black-letter 
law that a statute is divisible only if it contains multiple alternative elements, as opposed to 
multiple alternative means. Thus, when a court encounters a statute that is written in the 
disjunctive (that is, with an ‘or’), that fact alone cannot end the divisibility inquiry.” (citation 
omitted)), with United States v. Prater, 766 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding a New 
York statute divisible when it listed several alternative places that could be burgled in a 
disjunctive “or” statement)), rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
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those of the generic offense.”
117
 Next, the Court somewhat mischaracterized 
this issue in the case as whether the Act “makes an exception to that rule 
when a defendant is convicted under a statute that lists multiple, alternative 
means of satisfying one (or more) of its elements.”
118
 Contrary to the issue 
the Court presented, however, the real issue that the courts of appeals faced 
was determining what indeed qualified as an element and what qualified as 
a mean. The lower courts did not contest the elements-based categorical 






 the defendant in Mathis had been found guilty of 
being a felon in possession of a firearm and had a criminal history that 
included five separate second-degree burglary convictions in Iowa.
121
 The 
Iowa second-degree burglary statute punished the burgling of an “occupied 
structure,”
122
 which was elsewhere defined as “any building, structure, 
appurtenances to buildings and structures, land, water or air vehicle, or 
similar place adapted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied 
by persons for the purpose of carrying on business or other activity therein, 
or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value.”
123
 While this looked 
much like the statutes at issue in Taylor and Shepard and discussed in 
Descamps’s dicta, the Court ultimately disagreed, holding that this laundry 




The Court held that the elements of a crime are the pieces that a jury 
must agree upon beyond a reasonable doubt to return a conviction.
125
 Thus, 
for a jury to convict an Iowan defendant of burglary, they need only agree 
that the person burgled an occupied structure.
126
 They need not agree 
whether the structure was a boat, or a house, or an amalgam of the two; as 
long as the jurors all agree the place that was burgled was an “occupied 
                                                                                                                 
 117. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2247. 
 118. Id. at 2248.  
 119. Id. at 2248–49; see also Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1074–75 (citing Descamps v. United 
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2285 n.2) (2013); Prater, 766 F.3d at 510; Rendon, 764 F.3d at 
1085.  
 120. See supra notes 1–13 and accompanying text. 
 121. Mathis, 786 F.3d at 1070. 
 122. IOWA CODE §§ 713.1, 713.5 (2017). 
 123. Id. § 702.12. 
 124. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.  
 125. Id. at 2248. 
 126. State v. Rooney, 862 N.W.2d 367, 376 (Iowa 2015) (discussing the single “broadly 
phrased . . . element of place” in Iowa’s burglary law). 
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structure,” they could convict the defendant. Therefore, the laundry list of 
different places capable of being burgled in the Iowa burglary statute, 
according to Iowa law, were not elements but were merely different means 
of fulfilling the “occupied structure” element.  
Applying this rule to the case at hand, the Court found that the 
defendant’s five burglaries in Iowa—which were indeed burglaries of 
structures—did not qualify as ACCA predicates because the Iowa burglary 
statute was not divisible; instead, the statute had only one set of elements 
which criminalized conduct that was broader than generic burglary. As a 
result, the Court held that the lower court’s use of the modified categorical 




The ACCA has taken many twists and turns in its thirty-year history. 
Originally intended to broadly punish habitual offenders, the Court has 
continually narrowed its application through the legal technicalities of the 
categorical approach. The ACCA’s own chief architect, Senator Specter, 
expressed his dissatisfaction that recent Supreme Court cases had “severely 
limited [the Act’s] reach” by narrowly interpreting what was meant to be a 
broad application of the term “violent crime.”
128
 This narrowing has created 
a number of problems that continue to persist and must be remedied to steer 
the ACCA back onto the course for which it was intended. 
III. Thematic Problems of the Categorical Approach 
Needless to say, the Court’s categorical approach has created a host of 
inconsistencies. The legal fiction required by the categorical approach—
punishing habitual offenders according to the statutory elements of their 
previous convictions rather than the offender’s criminal conduct—reached a 
boiling point in Mathis and justified years of judges’ and academic 
commentators’ concerns that the categorical approach cannot be sustained 
from either a pragmatic or ideological standpoint.
129
 It should come as no 
surprise that when the Court tries to spin legal fiction based on truth, its 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 2257. 
 128. Kupfer, supra note 24, at 165 n.85 (quoting 156 CONG. REC. S10, 516–17 (daily ed. 
Dec. 17, 2010)).  
 129. See Evan Tsen Lee, Mathis v. U.S. and the Future of the Categorical Approach, 101 
MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 263, 265 (2016), http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/Lee-1.pdf (stating that the concurrences and dissents in Mathis 
addressed “two leading normative arguments for abolishing the categorical approach, one 
pragmatic and the other ideological”).  
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ever-branching webs of doctrine would eventually become tangled in 
themselves.  
A. The Categorical Approach Produces Bizarre and Unintended Results  
Again and again, lower courts have lodged their grievances against the 
categorical approach, believing that it fosters “an air of make-believe”
130
 
and even going as far as saying that it “produces nonsensical results.”
131
 
Judge Hand may have captured the problem best when commenting on a 
similar categorical approach in the immigration context, stating that when 
judges “may not consider the particular conduct for which the [criminal] 
has been convicted,” criminals who have committed serious offenses may 
avoid the intended punishment.
132
  
Judge Hand’s timeless realization rings true even today because the 
categorical approach continues to narrow the ACCA to the point that the 
very type of habitual offenders meant to be captured by the Act escape its 
punishment due to legal technicalities. In Taylor, the Court overturned the 
ACCA sentence of a criminal with a long criminal history that included 
robbery, assault, and two second-degree burglaries.
133
 In Shepard, the Court 
overturned the ACCA sentence of a criminal who had “dozens of prior state 
convictions, including eleven for breaking and entering.”
134
 In Descamps, 
the Court overturned the ACCA sentence of a criminal who had “five 
previous felony convictions,” which included “robbery, burglary, and 
felony harassment.”
135
 In Mathis, the Court overturned the ACCA sentence 
of a criminal who had “five [previous] burglary convictions” in addition to 
a previous conviction for “interference with official acts inflicting serious 
injury.”
136
 Thus, not only does the categorical approach go “against the 
grain” of our common-sense understanding of criminal justice,
137
 but it also 
contravenes Congress’s intent to incapacitate habitual offenders.
138
  
                                                                                                                 
 130. United States v. Shepard, 348 F.3d 308, 311 (1st Cir. 2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 16 
(2005).  
 131. United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 988 F.2d 1408, 1418 (5th Cir. 1993) (Jolly, J., 
concurring). 
 132. United States ex rel. Guarino v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399, 400 (2d Cir. 1939).  
 133. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 577 (1990). 
 134. Shepard, 348 F.3d at 309. 
 135. United States v. Descamps, 466 Fed. Appx. 563, 564 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 
S. Ct. 2276 (2013). 
 136. United States v. Mathis, 786 F.3d 1068, 1071, rev’d, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016). 
 137. Lee, supra note 21, at 23.  
 138. See Norah M. Roth, Comment, It’s Not Rape-Rape: Statutory Rape Classification 
Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 85 ST. JOHN L. REV. 1653, 1668 (2014) (“It is . . . 
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Congress made clear at every step of the way that the ACCA was 
designed to thwart repeat offenders in order to protect society against the 
disproportionate amount of crime they commit.
139
 The Court began to 
realize that its doctrine was veering off this path as early as Shepard, in 
which dissenting members of the Court criticized the categorical approach 
by stating that the majority’s ruling made “little sense as a practical matter, 
and . . . will substantially frustrate Congress’s scheme for punishing repeat 
violent offenders who violate federal gun laws.”
140
 This criticism was 
joined by many lower courts, which characterized the categorical approach 
as “counterfactual and counterintuitive because it [forbade] adjudicators 
from weighing factual allegations.”
141
  
In Descamps, Justice Kagan herself, the eventual author of the majority 
decision, stated during oral argument that finding for the criminal offender 
would be “a little bit insane.”
142
 During the same oral argument, Justice 
Breyer noted that many criminals who committed violent crimes will 
escape their intended ACCA sentence based on a technicality of legal 
fiction.
143
 Justice Kennedy noted in his concurrence that the Court’s 
decision would disqualify “an unspecified number . . . of state criminal 
statutes that[, similar to California,] are indivisible but that often do reach 
serious crimes otherwise subject to the ACCA’s provisions.”
144
 Justice 
                                                                                                                 
apparent that strict application of the law as it has evolved may not always serve the 
purposes of the ACCA.”). 
 139. See S. REP. NO. 98-190, 98th Cong. at 7 (1984); see also 134 CONG. REC. S88493 
(daily ed. June 23, 1988) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter). 
 140. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
 141. See Koh, supra note 19, at 1834 n.185 (citing Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 
133, 151 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting)) (criticizing possible “untoward consequences” of the 
categorical approach under the Armed Career Criminal Act); Tijani v. Holder, 628 F.3d 
1071, 1075 (9th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the categorical approach’s “[c]ounterfactual and 
counterintuitive” nature); Latu v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority’s “counter-intuitive holding” that a hit-
and-run statute does not involve a crime involving moral turpitude); Mary Holper, The New 
Moral Turpitude Test: Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1301 (2011) 
(“Some courts have questioned the [categorical] approach as unduly formulaic, as [it] 
requires the immigration judge to put on blinders as to what ‘really happened.’” (citing 
Montero- Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Miller, 478 F.3d 
48, 52 (1st Cir. 2007))). 
 142. Mark Middaugh, Comment, Debriefing Descamps: A Comment on Burglary and the 
Armed Career Criminal Act, 67 STAN. L. REV. 723, 729 (2015) (quoting Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 21, Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (No. 11-9540)). 
 143. Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 11). 
 144. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2293–94 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Further scholarship 
picked up where Justice Kennedy left off and confirmed that six states—Arizona, California, 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/3
2018]        PUNISHING CRIMINALS FOR THEIR CONDUCT 645 
 
 
Breyer voiced a similar concern in his dissent in Mathis, finding that the 
Court’s decision would disqualify several other state burglary statutes that 
were fashioned similarly to the Iowa statute at issue from ever serving as 
ACCA predicates.
145
 Finally, Justice Alito took a slightly different tack 
when dissenting to the Mathis decision, lamenting that the Court’s journey 
over the past twenty-five years had gone woefully off course.
146
 Doubling 
down on his dissent in Descamps,
147
 Justice Alito decried the Court’s 
jurisprudence as a path “that has increasingly led to results that Congress 
could not have intended.”
148
 
These unintended consequences, which see habitual offenders escaping 
punishment under the ACCA, are a result of the contrived categorical 
approach. The bizarre results that it produces are hard to grasp partially 
because the doctrine is not based in reality, but rather relies on the legal 
fiction that crimes are actually comprised of a set of elements, as opposed 
to the underlying criminal conduct. Thus, this competition between 
elements and means continues to be one of the most fundamental issues 
plaguing the ACCA.  
B. In the Elements vs. Means Debate, Everybody Loses  
“[T]he dichotomy between divisible and indivisible state 
criminal statutes is not all that clear.”  
‒ Justice Kennedy, concurring, Descamps v. 
United States 
                                                                                                                 
Idaho, Illinois, Nevada, and Rhode Island—had burglary statutes similar to California, thus 
disqualifying burglaries in these states as qualifying as ACCA predicates. See Middaugh, 
supra note 142, at 727-28 n.30-35.  
 145. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2263–64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 
18–4–101, 18–4–202, 18–4–203 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45–2–101, 45–6–201, 45–6–
204 (2015); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 635:1 (2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1–22–02, 
12.1–22–06 (West 2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2909.01, 2911.11–2911.13 (LexisNexis 
2014); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3501, 3502 (West 2015); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 22–1–2, 22–32–1, 22–32–3, 22–32–8 (2006); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 6–1–104, 6–3–
301 (2015); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 221.0, 221.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1980)); see also id. at 
2268 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court arrives at today’s decision, the upshot of which is 
that all burglary convictions in a great many States may be disqualified from counting as 
predicate offenses under ACCA.”). 
 146. Id. at 2266–67 (Alito, J., dissenting) (likening the Court’s doctrine to a woman’s 
real life two-day journey that took her hundreds of miles off course because of her blind trust 
in a malfunctioning GPS device).  
 147. See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2295–2303 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 148. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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From the beginning, Congress sought to fashion the ACCA to prevent 
“the possibility that culpable offenders might escape punishment on a 
technicality” based on the “wide variation among states and localities.”
149
 
Congress failed, and the Court exacerbated the problem by ensuring that a 
single technicality would indeed let a large number of habitual offenders off 
the hook. As mentioned above, the elements-means dichotomy highlighted 
in Descamps and Mathis has successfully disqualified the burglary statutes 
of several states based on the legal fiction that these state burglary statutes 
do not adequately conform to the generic definition of burglary. Further, 
while the Court in Mathis claimed it was preventing “inconsistency and 
arbitrariness” from polluting its past ACCA precedent,
150
 the decision 
succeeded in doing the opposite by calling Taylor and Shepard—both 
dealing with similar burglary statutes to the one at issue in Mathis— into 
question. 
The root of this inconsistency is found in Taylor itself and the Court’s 
original conception of the modified categorical approach. Taylor stated that 
a burglary statute that criminalized “entry of an automobile as well as a 
building” was divisible because it presented alternative elements and 
instructed that sentencing courts use the modified categorical approach.
151
  
This instruction in Taylor, however, was complicated by future decisions 
in Schad v. Arizona
152
 and Richardson v. United States,
153
 which established 
a different definition of the term “elements.” Schad touched on the 
elements-means distinction, holding that “[a]lthough a defendant is entitled 
to a unanimous jury verdict on whether the criminal act charged has been 
committed, the defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the 
precise manner in which the act was committed.”
154
 Schad also recognized 
that while state legislatures “frequently enumerate alternative means of 
committing a crime without intending to define separate elements or 
separate crimes,”
155
 the jury need only return a unanimous verdict on each 
element of the charged crime.
156
 
Richardson further clarified that “a jury in a federal criminal case cannot 
convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each 
                                                                                                                 
 149. S. REP. NO. 98-190, at 20 (2013).  
 150. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2257.  
 151. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (2013).  
 152. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).  
 153. 526 U.S. 813 (1999). 
 154. Schad, 501 U.S. at 629, 648 (citation omitted). 
 155. Id. at 636. 
 156. Richardson, 526 U.S. at 817.  
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 Thus, Richardson affirmed Schad, and offered an example of a 
robbery statute in which “an element of robbery is force or the threat of 
force.”
158
 As the example goes, some jurors might disagree whether  
the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might 
conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement—a disagreement 
about means—would not matter as long as all 12 jurors 
unanimously concluded that the Government had proved the 




This delineation between elements—the essential features of a crime that 
the jury must unanimously agree upon to convict the defendant—and 
means—the underlying brute facts that make up a particular element—was 




Unfortunately, when the Court picked up the ACCA issue again in 
Shepard, decided after both Schad and Richardson, it did not correct or 
update the elements-means doctrine previously espoused in Taylor. Instead, 
the Court doubled down on this stale precedent. In Shepard, which dealt 
with a statute that criminalized the burgling of multiple places such as 
buildings and automobiles, the Court found that the “divisible nature of the 
Massachusetts burglary statute” at issue “authorized sentencing courts to 
scrutinize a restricted set of materials” by implementing the modified 
categorical approach.
161
 This definition did little to clarify the elements-
means distinction; nevertheless, the Court found that the modified 
categorical approach—which can only be used when a state statute presents 
an alternative set of elements—was appropriate to use for Massachusetts’s 
burglary statute. In Descamps, the Court confounded the problem yet again 
by offering an example that misused the term “elements”:  
                                                                                                                 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. 
 160. See id. at 828 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“We begin on common ground, for, as the 
Court acknowledges, it is settled that jurors need not agree on all of the means the accused 
used to commit an offense.”). 
 161. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2284 (2013) (describing the Court’s 
analysis in Shepard); see also Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 35 (2009) (characterizing 
the burglary statute at issue in Shepard, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266 § 16, as being subject to 
the modified categorical approach). 
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[A]ssume . . . that a statute criminalizes assault with any of eight 
specified weapons; and suppose further . . . that only assault with 
a gun counts as an ACCA offense. A later sentencing court need 
only [use the modified categorical approach to] check the 
charging documents and instructions . . . to determine whether in 
convicting a defendant under that divisible statute, the jury 




Justice Alito put his finger on the issue when he argued that the definition 
of the term “elements” in Richardson is incompatible with the Court’s use 
of the term in Taylor and Shepard.
163
 Whereas the Court sought to adopt an 
elements-based approach, the examples given in Taylor, Shepard, and 
Descamps were not “elements” at all; rather, the Court was playing fast and 
loose with the precise legal definition of the term “elements” and had 
mistakenly listed different means.
164
 Thus, Alito came to the logical 
conclusion that the Court must have meant something different than 
“elements” when discussing divisibility in the context of its examples in 
Taylor, Shepard, and Descamps.
165
  
In other words, the Court confirmed in Taylor and Shepard that statutes 
listing alternative places that can be burgled were divisible and listed 
alternative elements. Descamps also used an example stating that a 
hypothetical assault statute that listed alternative weapons was also 
divisible, concluding that it listed alternative elements.
166
 Thus, Mathis 
went against this string of precedent when it stated for the first time that a 
statute was not divisible and did not list alternative elements when listing 
places that could be burgled. The dissent was right to express its disbelief in 
such a circumstance.  
The striking similarities between Taylor and Mathis were not lost on 
Justice Breyer: Taylor also involved a defendant convicted under a state’s 
seemingly overbroad second-degree burglary statute that included places 
like tents, booths, and railroad cars in its definition of places that could be 
burgled.
167
 In Taylor, the Court held that in such situations, the modified 
categorical approach could be utilized “to determine what the state 
                                                                                                                 
 162. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290 (emphasis added). 
 163. Id. at 2295-96 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 164. Id. at 2296. 
 165. Id. at 2297–98. 
 166. See id. at 2290 (majority opinion).  
 167. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2260 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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conviction was actually for: building, tent, or railroad car.”
168
 Yet in 
Mathis, after twenty-five years of muddling, the majority came to the 
opposite conclusion and defined these things as means, holding that the 
modified categorical approach was now inappropriate for such statutes.
169
  
Justice Alito, in a separate dissent, stated that the practical application of 
the elements vs. means test should have served as a “warning bell” that 
suggested the Court had “made a wrong turn at some point.”
170
 Justice 
Alito’s conclusion was clear: the Court should endeavor to fix the troubled 
doctrine by amending the categorical and modified categorical approach to 
allow “a sentencing court to take a look at the record in the earlier case to 
see if the place that was burglarized was a building or something else. If the 
record is lost or inconclusive, the court could refuse to count the 
conviction.”
171
 Even Justice Kennedy, who had joined the dissent in 
Shepard
172
 and issued a cautious concurrence in Descamps,
173
 found 
himself candidly wondering if the Court needed to take a new course to fix 
the current ACCA doctrine that seemed so contrary to its intent.
174
 
The enduring elements vs. means issue is largely the root cause of many 
of the ACCA’s problems. Comparing elements of predicate crimes to the 
federal generic version of the crime not only taxes judicial economy 
because of the difficult application of the rule, but also requires federal 
judges to rely on state law, which produces inconsistent results due to the 
various differences in the criminal codes of the fifty states.  
C. Uniformity and Fairness Suffers when Federal Punishment Is Based 
Upon the Inconsistencies Between States’ Laws 
“[A]bsent plain indication to the contrary, federal laws are not to 
be construed so that their application is dependent on state law.”  
-- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 
591 (1990). 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Id.  
 169. Id. at 2257 (majority opinion). 
 170. Id. at 2268 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 2269–70; see also Lee, supra note 129, at 269 (proposing a new rule that “in 
any case where it is ambiguous which portion of a statute generated the conviction in 
question, the conviction simply does not qualify”). 
 172. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 28 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 173. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2293 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 174. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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The categorical approach also manages to contravene legislative intent 
by ushering in a federal sentencing doctrine that is unevenly applied based 
upon the various differences between states’ criminal codes. The legislative 
history clearly shows that Congress sought to create a sentencing 
enhancement that would punish habitual offenders equally, regardless of the 
jurisdiction in which they committed their predicate offenses. Instead, after 





 had warned against: it “parse[d] state law”
177
 
and relied upon the differing definitions and precedents of the Iowa courts 
to determine the application of a federal sentencing enhancement.  
Once again, the root of this inconsistency can be traced back to Taylor, 
which presented a unique problem that the Court purported to solve, albeit 
through contradiction. While the Court acknowledged congressional intent 
to treat similar habitual offenders similarly based on “fundamental 
fairness,”
178
 it nevertheless instituted an elements-based categorical 
approach which required the consideration of state burglary statutes. As the 
Court itself has admitted, substantial variation exists among the states’ 
criminal codes because state supreme courts, not federal courts, have 
“substantial leeway in deciding what facts shall be essential elements of a 
statutory offense”
179
 and “are the ultimate expositors of state law.”
180
 Thus, 
in one inconsistent opinion, Congress’s ultimate intent was thrown to the 




Ever since Taylor, state law has played a major role in applying the 
ACCA. In other words, the ACCA’s application largely depends on how a 
state defines burglary and whether these state-law elements comported with 
the generic definition of burglary. Descamps doubled down on this logic to 
the derision of the dissent, which stated that “[t]he Court’s holding will 
hamper the achievement of [Congress’s] objectives by artificially limiting 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 475, 590–91 (1990). 
 176. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 n.2.  
 177. Id. 
 178. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581–82.  
 179. Lee, supra note 21, at 64 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) 
(noting that states have discretion to allocate essential elements in relation to affirmative 
defenses)); cf. McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (discussing how the 
applicability of the reasonable-doubt standard is generally dependent on how state defines 
the offense in terms of essential elements). 
 180. Lee, supra note 21, at 64 (citing Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 
590 (1874); R.R. Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496 (1941)). 
 181. See supra notes 44–49 and accompanying text.  
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[the] ACCA’s reach and treating similar convictions differently based 
solely on the vagaries of state law.”
182
 In Mathis, the Court’s disregard for 
federal uniformity reached its height, disregarding Taylor and Descamps by 
directly relying on a state supreme court case to apply federal law.
183
 Justice 
Kennedy’s concurrence succinctly captured the problem in noting the “vast 
sentencing disparities for defendants convicted of identical criminal 
conduct in different jurisdictions.”
184
 
As the Court has recognized in other contexts, “[b]ecause the application 
of federal legislation is nationwide . . . the federal program would be 
impaired if state law were to control.”
185
 These inconsistencies are not 
merely problematic because they contravene congressional intent; they also 
produce disproportionate sentences,
186
 result in false positives in which 
non-violent non-habitual defendants are sentenced as “career criminals,”
187
 
and even reduce the deterrent effect of the ACCA.
188
  
Trying to come to grips with this inherent inconsistency, courts have in 
vain attempted to explain this reliance on state law by arguing that 
Congress was aware that such inconsistencies would arise but nevertheless 
forged ahead with the ACCA because federalism concerns outweighed 
these inconsistencies.
189
 This logic, however, completely ignores actual 
congressional intent and basic tenets of federal interpretation of nationwide 
                                                                                                                 
 182. Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2302 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 183. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).  
 184. Id. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 185. Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 119–120 (1983). 
 186. See Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1408 (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 19 
(2003) (affirming a sentence of twenty-five-years-to-life imprisonment for theft of golf 
clubs)). 
 187. Id. (citing United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding 
defendant to have a criminal “career” consisting of theft of lobster tails from a grocery store, 
verbal threat to a security guard, and convictions for drunk driving); see also Beverly G. 
Dyer, Revising Criminal History: Model Sentencing Guidelines §§ 4.1-4.2, 18 FED. SENT’G 
REP. 373, 376 (2006) (“[ACCA] has been used to sweep in far too many crimes that present 
a relatively remote risk of the use of physical force or physical injury.”). 
 188. See Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1408 (citing Stephen R. Sady, ACCA Lessons: The 
Armed Career Criminal Act-What's Wrong with “Three Strikes, You’re Out”?, 7 FED. 
SENT’G REP. 69, 70 (1994) (“The [ACCA] can strike like a lightning bolt, rather than serve 
as a rational deterrent.”)). 
 189. See United States v. Duval, 496 F.3d 64, 83 (1st Cir. 2007) (“Congress implicitly 
accepted such inconsistencies in the application of the ACCA because it was concerned 
about federalism and wanted to preserve the state’s role in defining, enforcing, and 
prosecuting essentially local crimes . . . .”). 
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statutory schemes, which provide uniformity in the midst of the different 
laws of the states and territories.
190
  
Allowing states dispositive influence over federal sentencing contravenes 
the intent of Congress and conflicts with basic notions of fairness and 
justice. Instead of punishing like offenders and offenses alike, habitual 
offenders under the ACCA can be punished differently based on where they 
grew up and where they committed their first crimes. The Court must 
address these problems and must start the difficult job of extricating ACCA 
doctrine from the deep, Court-created hole in which it currently sits.  
IV. Solving the Federal Problem with an Analysis of Approaches 
Taken by the States 
The shortcomings of the categorical approach are legion, and many 
judicial and academic commentators have not only suggested a change in 
course,
191
 but also have devised various methods to fix the failing 
doctrine.
192
 This Article proposes a simple yet novel solution to fix the 
ACCA’s problems: consider how the states deal with the same problem in 
their habitual-offender statutes. This may seem like an odd solution given 
that the previous section highlighted the problem of relying on state law, 
but this proposed solution is actually quite different in kind. Whereas the 
current ACCA doctrine is applied differently based on the state in which the 
defendant committed a predicate offense, this Article instead seeks to learn 
from how states apply their own habitual-offender laws uniformly when 
they encounter criminals who have committed predicate offenses in other 
jurisdictions. By learning from these states, the Court can employ one 
uniform application that is immune to the faults of the categorical approach. 
Habitual-offender statutes exist in almost all fifty states,
193
 which have 
been applying these criminal statutes since colonial times.
194
 The states’ 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See Lamprecht, supra note 27, at 1430 n.124 (“One of the rationales for ACCA-type 
sanctions was the alleviation of the difficulties ‘encountered by Federal courts in applying 
State robbery and burglary laws in Federal prosecutions.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-1073, at 
5 (1984)). 
 191. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2258 (2016) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); id. at 2262 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lee, supra note 129, at 269.  
 192. Some commentators have suggested having a comprehensive list of all state crimes 
that qualify as “violent felonies” under the ACCA to clear up any potential confusion. See, 
e.g., Kupfer, supra note 24, at 154-55; Lee, supra note 21, at 7; Hayley A. Montgomery, 
Comment, Remedying the Armed Career Criminal Act’s Ailing Residual Provision, 33 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 715, 736 (2010). 
 193. See Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 26 (1992).  
 194. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.  
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habitual-offender statutes come in all shapes and sizes, punish for different 
conduct, and impose different penalties for repeat offenders. One of the few 
things that the state laws have in common with the ACCA, however, is that 
they seek to punish repeat offenders who are a harm to society by counting 
felony convictions from other states toward the habitual-offender statutes’ 
required number of predicate offenses.
195
 One might even argue that the 
ACCA was inspired by these state laws, many of which were on the books 
long before the 1980s. Thus, in an era of cooperative federalism, ACCA 
doctrine has much to gain by considering different state approaches to 
determining whether felonies committed in other jurisdictions qualify as 
predicate offenses.  
The federal government and the states have a long history of fashioning 
laws after one another. States fashion laws after successful federal 
statutes,
196
 and the federal government has been known to do the same 
when vanguard states provide useful models that could further federal 
policy.
197
 In other controversial public policy initiatives, the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 195. The only exception may be Arkansas’ habitual-offender statute, but there is split 
authority on this issue. An Eighth Circuit case, Prichard v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 
1993), suggests that Arkansas’s habitual-offender statute may not count out-of-state 
convictions as predicates. “Under the plain language of [ARK. CODE ANN. §] 5-64-401(c), a 
defendant’s previous out-of-state conviction is not a violation of ‘this subsection’ of the 
statute and therefore could not be used to increase Prichard’s offense level under the 
statute.” Id. at 354. But, the Arkansas Supreme Court’s own interpretation has included out-
of-state convictions under its habitual offender laws.  See Green v. State, 852 S.W.2d 
110,113 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that convictions from other states can be used to 
increase sentences under habitual-offender laws); McGirt v. State, 708 S.W.2d 620, 622 
(Ark. 1986) (finding similarly to Green). 
 196. See, e.g., Mendoza v. Town of Ross, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352, 459 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(relying on federal law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in order to 
interpret California’s own Fair Employment and Housing Act because “the 
antidiscrimination objectives and relevant wording of title VII . . . [and other federal 
antidiscrimination statutes] are similar to those of the FEHA”). 
 197. See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. No. 1905 (1994) (statement of Rep. Myron Kreideler) 
(“I’m glad we are enacting in Federal law the principle Washington State voters approved 
last year by a 3 to 1 majority: Anyone who commits three violent felonies, anywhere, gets 
locked up for good.”); Nick Glass, Romney: Without Romneycare, No Obamacare, POLITICO 
(Oct. 23, 2015, 3:13 P.M.), http://www.politico.com/story/2015/10/mitt-romney-
romneycare-obamacare-boston-globe-215112 (detailing how former Massachusetts 
Governor Mitt Romney’s state-based medical coverage plan paved the way for the larger 
federal health coverage plan). 
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government has taken a conservative wait-and-see approach, content to 
study the results from state experiments.
198
  
Federal courts have also relied upon state court interpretations to assist 
deciphering complex federal legislative schemes. For example, when 
defining what constituted “elements” in Richardson, the Court was 
informed by various state laws that did not require juror unanimity on 
underlying criminal acts.
199
 The dissent too relied upon state court 
precedent to argue for a certain interpretation, since these state criminal 





 the Court conducted what amounted to a nearly 
fifty-state survey to inform its interpretation of a federal criminal 
sentencing statute.
202
 The Court subsequently based its interpretation of the 
                                                                                                                 
 198. See, e.g., Beau Kilmer, The Legal Marijuana Middle Ground: Column, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 30, 2016, 6:00 A.M.), https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/11/30/ 
marijuana-legalize-states-medical-recreational-column/94553192/ (recognizing that “[s]tates 
are the laboratories of democracy, so let them experiment” and postulating on different 
models that would allow the federal government to legalize the states’ regulation of 
marijuana).  
 199. Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 821 (1999) (ultimately disagreeing with 
state statutes, in part, because jury unanimity was not a constitutional requirement in these 
states) (citing People v. Gear, 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 263–66 (Ct. App. 1993) (regarding crime 
for continuous sexual abuse of a child); People v. Reynolds, 689 N.E. 2d 375, 343-44 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1997) (regarding criminal sexual assault of a minor and aggravated sexual abuse of 
a minor); State v. Spigarolo, 556 A.2d 112, 127-29 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989) (regarding crime 
for committing an act likely to impair the health or morals of a child); Soper v. State, 731 
P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) (regarding crime for sexual assault in the first 
degree)).  
 200. Id. at 833 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Adames, 62 Cal Rptr. 2d 631 
(Ct. App. 1997) (regarding crime of continuous sexual abuse of a child)); People v. 
Reynolds, 689 N.E. 2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (regarding criminal sexual assault and 
aggravated sexual abuse of a minor); State v. Molitor, 565 N.W. 2d 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1997) (regarding crime of repeated sexual intercourse with underage partner); State v. 
Doogan, 917 P.2d 155 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (regarding crime of advancing prostitution and 
profiting from prostitution)). 
 201. 557 U.S. 29 (2009).  
 202. Id. at 40. Attempting to interpret Congress’s intent regarding the monetary threshold 
for certain acts of fraud and deceit, the Court found that 
29 States had no major fraud or deceit statute with any relevant monetary 
threshold. In 13 of the remaining 21 States, fraud and deceit statutes contain 
relevant monetary thresholds but with amounts significantly higher than 
$10,000, leaving only 8 States with statutes in respect to which subparagraph 
(M)(i)'s $10,000 threshold, as categorically interpreted, would have full effect. 
Id. 
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federal statute on its findings from the states.
203
 Taylor itself, the root of the 
problem, attempted to rely on state laws to employ one uniform definition 
for generic burglary. The Court reasoned that what “Congress meant by 
‘burglary’” in the ACCA was “the generic sense in which the term is now 
used in the criminal codes of most States.”
204
 Thus, this methodology—
which asks federal courts to glean from the wisdom of state courts that 
address similar problems—has many sources of precedent.  
Among the many types of different state habitual-offender statutes this 
Article considers, “three strikes” laws are particularly interesting.
205
 While 
the state and federal versions of the three strikes law vary in significant 
ways from the ACCA,
206
 there are similarities in both intent and 
                                                                                                                 
 203. Id. (“We do not believe Congress would have intended (M)(i) to apply in so limited 
and so haphazard a manner.”); see also United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 427–28 
(2009). In Hayes the Court undertook a similar state survey to interpret a federal domestic 
violence statute, finding that 
only about one-third of the States had criminal statutes that specifically 
proscribed domestic violence. . . . Given the paucity of state and federal statutes 
targeting domestic violence, we find it highly improbable that Congress meant 
to extend § 922(g)(9)’s firearm possession ban only to the relatively few 
domestic abusers prosecuted under laws rendering a domestic relationship an 
element of the offense. 
Id.  
 204. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 598 (1990) (citing Perrin v. United States, 
444 U.S. 37, 45 (1979) (using state law to define the bounds for the undefined term 
“bribery” in 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976)); United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 289 (1969) 
(using state law to define the bounds of the undefined term “extortion” in 18 U.S.C. § 1952) 
(1976)).  
 205. This Article does not take a position on the efficacy of three strikes laws, which has 
been explored in great depth by criminologist scholars and practitioners. Compare Walter L. 
Gordon III, California’s Three Strikes Law: Tyranny of the Majority, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 
577, 580 (1999) (arguing that empirical data shows that California’s Three Strikes law has 
been ineffective because the decline in crime after passage of these laws corresponds with an 
already declining crime rate), with Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law Is Working in 
California, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 23 (1999) (arguing that the empirical data on the 
California Three Strikes law shows that it is working by lowering the crime rate). Rather, 
three strikes laws are merely one source to which the federal courts can look to find a 
uniform rule to ensure that habitual offenders are punished equally regardless of which 
jurisdiction they committed their predicate criminal acts. 
  It is outside the scope of this Article to comment on the moral or philosophical 
strengths and weaknesses of mandatory minimum life sentences, or even the efficacy of 
these sentencing schemes. Instead, this Article focuses on statutory interpretation and 
practical application of the ACCA and other statute habitual-offender statutes.  
 206. For example, three strikes laws often require mandatory life imprisonment upon 
conviction of a serious felony, usually one that includes violence. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
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draftsmanship that make a comparison relevant. Both, for example, are 
recidivist statutes premised on the public policy that a small number of 
criminals commit a stunning amount of the crime in society.
207
 Both are 
triggered when the defendant has committed a certain number of qualifying 
crimes.
208
 Most importantly, both consider qualifying crimes from other 
sovereigns as predicates to enhanced sentences.
209
 Thus, it can be argued 
that the “terms and penalties of the ACCA” served as “a prelude to the 
increasingly popular ‘three strikes’ legislation”
210
 that swept the country in 
the mid-1990s. It could even be argued that the straightforward drafting of 
the federal three strikes statute—the statutory language of which has never 
required Supreme Court interpretation
211
—was a result of Congress’s hard-




                                                                                                                 
§ 3559(c) (2012). See generally Thomas W. Hillier, Comparing Three Strikes and the 
ACCA—Lessons to Learn, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 78 (1995). In addition, due to the potential 
punishment, most three strikes laws drastically limit the number and types of crimes that can 
count as “strikes.” Id. 
 207. See supra note 30 and accompanying text; 140 CONG. REC. No. 34 (1994), 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1994-03-23/html/CREC-1994-03-23-pt1-PgH36.htm 
(statement of Rep. Myron Kreidler) (expressing his happiness that Congress was adopting a 
federal “three strikes” provision through the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994 because “[t]hat’s how to protect society from the small group of criminals who 
do the most harm, over and over again.”); Ilene M. Shinbein, Comment, “Three-Strikes and 
You’re Out”: A Good Political Slogan to Reduce Crime, but a Failure in Its Application, 22 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 175, 189 (1996) (“Senator Trent Lott, sponsor 
of the federal crime bill, noted in support of the ‘three-strikes’ measure that only 6 percent of 
all violent offenders commit 70 percent of all violent crimes and that 76 percent of those 
with three or more incarcerations tend to commit crimes again when they get out of 
prison.”). 
 208. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012), with 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A) (2012), and 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (2012). 
 209. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), (e)(2)(B), with 18 U.S.C. §§ 3559(c)(1)(A), 
(c)(2), and CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1). 
 210. See Hillier, supra note 206, at 78. 
 211. Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 1640 (2016) (recognizing that the Court has never 
“construed the [Three Strikes federal] statute”).  
 212. The ACCA was originally passed in 1984. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 924 (e) (2012)). The 
three strikes laws were passed all within a few years of each other starting with Washington 
in 1993, and ending with Indiana in 1996. See Ronald F. Wright, Three Strikes Legislation 
and Sentencing Commission Objectives, 20 LAW & POL’Y 429, 444–47 tbl. 2 (1998) (listing 
all jurisdictions that enacted three strikes laws and their dates of passage); see also Nolan E. 
Jones, Three Strikes and You’re Out: A Symbolic Crime Policy?, in CRIME CONTROL AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE DELICATE BALANCE 53, 56 (Darnell F. Hawkins et al. eds., Greenwood 
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By studying and categorizing the way that states deal with the problem 
of applying their own habitual-offender laws to criminals who have 
committed offenses in other jurisdictions, the federal courts stand to learn 
and, as a result, may be able to fashion an appropriate substitute for the 
failing categorical approach.  
V. When in Rhode Island: Analysis of State Approaches 
to Predicate Crimes  
The states have taken several different approaches to determining which 
prior crimes should count toward sentencing a criminal as a habitual 
offender. These variations stem from the fact that each state enjoys 
sovereignty to dictate its own system of criminal laws and procedures, as 
long as these laws do not violate the federal Constitution.
213
 While these 
variations differ as to form, structure, and even what crimes can serve as 
predicates,
214
 there are still many common lessons that the federal courts 
can glean.  
A. Developing an Exhaustive List of Predicate Offenses 
Like the ACCA, most states specifically list crimes, or classes of crimes, 
that qualify as predicates for habitual-offender sentencing enhancement. 
The states have taken the time, however, to specify and define these 
enumerated crimes to ensure minimal judicial confusion when applied.  
For example, states like Alabama categorize crimes in terms of their 
level of offense.
215
 Alabama determines predicate offenses and the habitual-
sentencing enhancements they garner based on Class A, B, and C felonies. 
Thus, in Alabama, when a habitual offender is convicted of a Class A 
felony, but already has, say, a Class C felony on his or her record, “he or 
she must be punished by imprisonment for life or for any term of not more 
than 99 years but not less than 15 years.”
216
 The punishments range on a 
sliding scale based on the class of the current conviction and the class of the 
                                                                                                                 
Press 2003) (“Between 1993 and 1995, some twenty-four states and the federal government 
enacted laws around the style of ‘three strikes.’”). 
 213. See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text. 
 214. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-
Strikes Laws, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 101–02 (2001) (highlighting the differences between 
the three strikes laws in California, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, North Dakota, South 
Carolina, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Nevada, North Carolina, Vermont, and 
Utah). 
 215. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (2015). 
 216. Id. § 13A-5-9 (a)(3). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
658 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:623 
 
 
previous conviction(s), with Class A being the most serious and Class C 
being the least serious.
217 
Other states, such as New Jersey and Hawaii, also 
take a similar approach.
218
  
Just under half the states are even more specific and list distinct felony 
crimes that serve as predicates; these habitual-offender statutes also cross-
reference the definitions of these enumerated crimes by citing the 
definitions from states’ respective criminal codes. Montana, for example, 
lists crimes such as homicide, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, 
robbery, and sex crimes in its three strikes statute, all while citing the 
criminal code statute that defines these crimes.
219
 Such an approach cuts 
down on any potential confusion as to which crimes the habitual-offender 
statute refers. Under such an approach, a sentencing judge would need only 
look to an offender’s prior criminal record to see if any of his or her prior 




The advantages of this approach are obvious—federal judges would be 
relieved of the confusing task of determining divisibility and parsing state 
law, and would instead need only refer to an exhaustive list of predicate 
state law offenses qualifying as ACCA predicates. In the context of the 
Taylor-Mathis divide, this inventoried list of predicate crimes would 
enumerate each and every burglary offense from each jurisdiction that 
                                                                                                                 
 217. Id. § 13A-5-9(a)–(c). 
 218. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-801 (2017); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (West 2017); IOWA 
CODE § 902.8 (1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080(6)–(7) (West 1974); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 558.016 (West 2017); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2003); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 
(McKinney 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-106 (2010).  
 219. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-219 (2015). 
 220. Over twenty states have structured their habitual-offender statutes under such a 
model to remove confusion and ensure that those meant to be sentenced as habitual 
offenders do not escape just desserts through a legal technicality. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 13-105, 13-701 (2015); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1192.7(c)(1) (West 2012); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 53a-40 (2015); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1804a, 23-1331(4) (West 2013); FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 775.084 (West 2016); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5(1)(a)–(ee) (2016); MD. CODE 
ANN. CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (West 2017); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 279 § 25 (West 2012); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 769.12(6) (2012); MINN. STAT. § 609.1095 (2014); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 99-19-83, 97-3-2 (2014); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.012 
(2014); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-23 (2004); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09.1 (2017); 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9714(g) (2012); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS §§ 22-7-8.1, 22-1-2(9) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-120 (1995); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2013); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (2000); W.VA. CODE § 61-11-18(b) (2000); WIS. STAT. § 939.62 (2016).  
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qualified as a predicate. Practically, federal judges would only need to 
confirm that the defendant was convicted of a particular statute from a 
particular state, and the job would be done. Applying this approach would 
be even simpler in a majority of cases in which habitual offenders concede 
their past convictions. The benefits of this listing approach are many and 
have been recognized by jurists and commentators alike as a way to 
simplify the Act’s application.
221
  
While the practical application of a listing approach has appeal, one of 
the primary problems with such an approach is the extensive research into 
the voluminous criminal codes of all the states and other jurisdictions that 
would be required to compile an exhaustive list. Such a herculean task 
would cost tremendous amounts of time and resources. Such a task could be 
completed, however, under the familiar committee approach we have seen 
in other large judicial endeavors. Committees of judges, academics, and 
policy makers have come together before to gift the legal community with 




 and Appellate 
Procedure,
224
 and the comprehensive Sentencing Guidelines.
225
 Still today, 
                                                                                                                 
 221. See, e.g., Chambers v. United States¸ 555 U.S. 122, 134 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“[T]he only tenable, long-term solution is for Congress to formulate a specific list of 
expressly defined crimes that are deemed to be worthy of ACCA’s sentencing 
enhancement.”), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015); Lee, supra 
note 21, at 7–8; Kupfer, supra note 24, at 155; Montgomery, supra note 192, at 736. 
 222. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created and maintained through a joint 
effort of the Supreme Court, the House Committee on the Judiciary, and a Committee on 
Rules and Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United States. See Bob Goodlatte, Foreword 
to FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE iii (2011). 
 223. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are very similar in terms of origin and 
maintenance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules were created and are 
maintained through a joint effort of the Supreme Court, the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, and a Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee 
on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United 
States. See id. 
 224. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are again very similar in terms of origin 
and maintenance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules were created and are 
maintained through a joint effort of the Supreme Court, the House Committee on the 
Judiciary, and a Committee on Rules and Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee 
on the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, and the Judicial Conference of the United 
States. See id. 
 225. The United States Sentencing Commission, “an independent agency in the judicial 
branch composed of seven voting and two non-voting, ex officio members,” compiles the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines and submits amendments every year. U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1 pt. A (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016). 
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committees continue to work perennially to update these large bodies of 
work as they see fit. What distinguishes large-scale projects like the Codes 
of Procedure and the suggested inventoried list of ACCA predicates is 
scope. While the former is used and referred to by millions in the legal 
community, the ACCA does not have that kind of reach. Thus, the judicial 
community may not view the use of the committee system to create a list of 
ACCA predicates as a benefit commensurate with the needs of the judicial 
system. Nevertheless, given the sum of judicial resources being spent on 
ACCA litigation,
226
 it is quite possible that the resources saved by the 
judiciary and the value of a much-needed clarification for practitioners 
would outweigh the costs of such a committee.  
The time and resources necessary to complete this task, however, may 
not be as problematic as the potential political fallout if Congress were to 
get such a comprehensive list wrong. Congress might be wary of compiling 
such a list because they may be blamed by the public when habitual 
offenders slip through the cracks as a result of the non-inclusion of various 
predicate felonies on the so-called exhaustive list.
227
 While lists are often a 
source of easy application,  they are also a source of potential problems if 
the list is not exhaustive enough. Thus, laws like the ACCA that enumerate 
crimes usually leave the heavy lifting (and potential blame) to the courts to 
determine if an unenumerated crime is enough like the enumerated crimes 
to be encompassed by the Act. Unfortunately, it was this discretion of the 
courts that has gotten us into this current predicament in the first place, 
evidence that a new, exhaustive list approach may be worth the resources 
required to bring it about.  
B. Proving Predicate Offenses by Looking at the Punishment and 
Classification of the Convicting State 
The most widespread approach among the states offers yet another 
simple solution: determining predicate felonies based solely on the 
punishment they garner in the state of conviction. While this 
straightforward approach has appeal due to its elementary nature and ease 
of application, it is unlikely to be a solution for the federal courts because, 
like the categorical approach, this solution would mandate that federal 
courts rely heavily on state law to apply the ACCA.  
                                                                                                                 
 226. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. 
 227. Lee, supra note 21, at 8 (“Probably the biggest obstacle to the inventory approach, 
however, is political. For Congress to create such exhaustive lists is for Congress to invite 
blame when individual recidivists fall through the cracks.”).  
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Arizona, along with states like Hawaii and Oregon, follows this 
approach,
228
 determining predicates in part by determining whether the 
crime “was punishable by [the other] jurisdiction as a felony.”
229
 
Mississippi has gone even further by explicitly stating that the “plain 
language” of its habitual-offender statute “does not require that the prior 
convictions must also be felonies in Mississippi; rather, they must be 
felonies in the state where the conviction occurred.”
230
 Thus, these habitual-
offender statutes truly give full faith and credit to the laws of other states, at 
times counting predicate felonies from these convicting states that may not 
be classified as felonies in the current forum.  
Massachusetts’s doctrine differs slightly because it determines predicate 
felonies based partly on the actual sentence and partly on time served in 
prison for the predicate offense.
231
 Kentucky employs a similar approach, 
requiring that predicate felony convictions be “accompanied by a sentence 
of imprisonment for one year.”
232
 These habitual-offender statutes not only 
refer to the potential punishment of predicate crimes in other jurisdictions; 
instead, these statutes also rely on the actual punishment that was meted out 
by the convicting state.
233
 In other words, these states place more 
importance on the actual punishment that an offender received for his prior 
crime as opposed to whether the prior crime was merely punishable as a 
                                                                                                                 
 228. HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.725(2)(c) (2008); see 
also ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-4-501 (2017), 5-4-503 (1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-
17(d)(2)(c) (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09.1.c (2017); Iowa v. Gillison, 766 N.W.2d 
649 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009). 
 229. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-105(e) (2015).  
 230. Logan v. State, 2012-KA-01963-COA, 192 So. 3d 1012, 1021 (Miss. Ct. App. 
2015) (finding that Kentucky conviction qualified as predicate offense because it was 
considered a felony in that jurisdiction); see also State v. Allen, 2001 MT 266, ¶ 20, 37 P.3d 
655, 659 (Mont. 2001) (finding that prior California crime could serve as predicate offense 
because of its status as a felony as defined by the California Code); Gunderson v. State, 925 
P.2d 1300, 1305 (Wyo. 1996) (“The fact that the previous convictions were felonies in the 
rendering states but may not have been felonies in Wyoming is immaterial. The convictions 
were still felony convictions.”). 
 231. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25(a) (West 2012) (In 2012, Massachusetts 
amended its habitual-offender statute to apply to predicate offenses in other jurisdictions in 
which the defendant was “sentenced to state prison or state correctional facility . . . for a 
term not less than 3 years by . . . another state, or the United States.”).  
 232. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (commentary) (West 2012). 
 233. See also State v. King, 724 N.W. 2d 80, 84 (Neb. 2006) (finding that the state must 
show, among other things, that the offender was “sentenced and committed to prison for not 
less than 1 year” for a crime from another jurisdiction to qualify as a predicate); State v. 
Russo, 62 A.3d 798, 808 (N.H. 2013) (finding similarly to King).  
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felony. Perhaps the logic behind such a distinction is based on a premise 
that those who are actually sentenced to over a year in prison (as opposed to 
those who could have been sentenced to such a term, but were not) are the 
hardened criminals who actually deserved such a sentence.  
The states justify this punishment approach as a way to “achieve a 
uniform standard for grading foreign convictions.”
234
 While this approach 
indeed establishes a uniform application, it threatens fundamental fairness 
by treating offenders differently based on the differences in state criminal 
codes. Thus, two offenders who committed the same crime in two different 
states, say California and Arizona, could be treated differently if they were 
to go on to each commit a felony in Nevada. If the Nevada courts used the 
punishment approach, the California offender may be sentenced under 
Nevada’s habitual-offender statute because California treated the prior 
offense as a felony; in contrast, the Arizona offender would not receive the 
harsher sentence of the habitual-offender statute because the same conduct 
committed in Arizona was not considered a felony by Arizona law.  
Much like the current ACCA doctrine, federal judges would find 
themselves parsing state law
235
 and basing their determinations of predicate 
felonies on the different ways the fifty states utilize their police powers in 
their respective criminal codes. This is exactly the type of disparate 
treatment based on state law variances that the current categorical approach 




C. Determining Predicate Offenses with a Conduct-Based Approach 
While the listing- and punishment-based approaches are both 
problematic, a promising paradigm shift may be found in a conduct-based 
approach. Such an approach—as opposed to the current elements-based 
categorical approach—would greatly simplify current ACCA doctrine. 
Several states successfully rely on a conduct-based approach, which 
considers the criminal conduct of habitual offenders’ past crimes when 
determining if the past crimes should count as predicates.  
In Michigan, for example, a court was tasked with deciding whether an 
offender’s prior conviction for aggravated assault in Ohio should be 
counted as a predicate under Michigan’s habitual-offender statute.
237
 Rather 
than trudging through a comparison of the elements of the offenses, the 
                                                                                                                 
 234. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-655 (commentary) (West 1986).  
 235. See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text. 
 236. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.  
 237. People v. Quintanilla, 571 N.W.2d 228, 288 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
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court held that “the facts of the out-of-state crime, rather than the words or 
title of the out-of-state statute under which the conviction arose, are 
determinative.”
238
 Alabama courts have echoed this logic, holding that “[i]n 
determining whether an out-of-state conviction will be used to enhance 
punishment pursuant to the [habitual-offender statute], the conduct upon 
which the foreign conviction is based must be considered and not the 
foreign jurisdiction’s treatment of that conduct.”
239
 Thus, Alabama courts 
bypass an examination of the similar elements of the out-of-state crime and 
the generic or Alabama parallel offense and look instead to the conduct. In 
other words, if the conduct in the other state would have been a predicate 
offense if committed in the sentencing state, the out-of-state conviction 
counts as a predicate. 
Several other states have followed suit. Indiana, for example, analyzes 
“out-of-state convictions as if they had been committed in Indiana.”
240
 
Thus, in cases like Lampitok v. State,
241
 the court examined the offender’s 
conduct in a prior Illinois conviction for “delivery of a controlled substance 
and criminal drug conspiracy,” and found that, under Indiana law, the 





 and the District of Columbia
244
 
have also hinted at examining conduct, as opposed to elements, to 
determine whether out-of-state convictions should be considered predicate 
offenses under their respective habitual-offender statutes. 
Louisiana goes even further—its habitual-offender statute memorializes 
the understanding that out-of-state crimes can serve as predicates for 
Louisiana’s habitual-offender statute if the crime, “if committed in this 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Id. 
 239. Skinner v. State, 987 So. 2d 1172, 1175 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006) (quoting Daniels v. 
State, 621 So. 2d 335, 342 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)). 
 240. Weiss v. State, 903 N.E.2d 557, 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). 
 241. 817 N.E.2d 630 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). 
 242. Id. at 644. 
 243. Delaware considers the underlying conduct of out-of-state convictions if there is 
ambiguous language in the out-of-state law. See, e.g., Sammons v. State, 68 A.3d 192, 195-
96 (Del. 2013); Hall v. Delaware, 788 A.2d 118, 128 (Del. 2001) (“Delaware courts have 
said that in order to qualify as a predicate offense, the conduct leading to an out-of-state 
judgment must be such that it would have supported a conviction for the appropriate 
predicate offense in Delaware.”). 
 244. See Brake v. United States, 494 A.2d 646, 650 (1985) (“We hold that, as to the 
assault and sodomy crimes at issue here, the phrase “‘necessarily includes’ may be construed 
by reference to the facts of the previous crime, not merely to the statutory elements of that 
crime.”). 
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State would be a felony.”
245
 Following this statutory instruction, a 
Louisiana court looked to an offender’s conduct in State v. Grimes to find 
the offender “fired six shots at a uniformed Alabama State Trooper,”
246
 and 
“[i]n connection with that Alabama offense, defendant pled guilty to the 
attempted murder of a police officer which is a felony in Louisiana.”
247
 
Georgia, however, has gone the furthest, suggesting that merely 
analyzing the elements of a prior offense is not enough. In Lewis v. State, 
the court examined a prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault, but 
found that merely examining the elements of that crime did not suffice 
because “[i]t is possible that Lewis was convicted under this provision, and 
this conduct may not constitute a felony in Georgia.”
248
 Accordingly, the 
defendant’s habitual-offender sentence was overturned and the matter was 
remanded to the sentencing court to either find information regarding the 
underlying conduct of the Tennessee conviction or resentence the offender 
without applying the habitual-offender statute.
249
 





have adopted somewhat of a hybrid approach that considers the underlying 
                                                                                                                 
 245. LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(a) (2010). 
 246. 16 So. 3d 418, 427 (La. Ct. App. 2009); see also State v. Uloho, 875 So. 2d 918, 
928–29 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (“For a conviction from another state to serve as a predicate 
felony for purposes for enhancement, the conviction must be for a ‘crime which, if 
committed in this state would be a felony . . . .’”) (alteration in original) (quoting LA. STAT. 
ANN. § 15:529.1(a)(1) (2010)).  
 247. Grimes, 16 So. 3d at 427. 
 248. 587 S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); see also Walker v. Hale, 657 S.E.2d 
227, 230 (Ga. 2008) (“Although the language of the indictment does not directly track the 
language found in Georgia’s murder statute, OCGA § 16-5-1, it is sufficient to show that the 
same offense, if committed in this State, would constitute a serious violent felony as defined 
in OCGA § 17-10-6.1(a).”); Smith v. State, 527 S.E.2d 609, 609 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) 
(finding that Florida indictment was “sufficient to prove that defendant was convicted of two 
offenses in Florida which would have each been the serious violent felony of armed robbery 
had the offenses been committed in Georgia”). 
 249. Lewis, 587 S.E.2d at 246–47.  
 250. See Commonwealth v. Spenny, 128 A.3d 234, 250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (looking to 
“facts underlying the prior conviction” once the court compares the elements of the two 
crimes “for grading purposes”).  
 251. See In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 111 P.3d 837, 841 (Wash. 2005) (looking first to 
whether the “elements of the Washington crime and the foreign crime” are substantially 
similar, then looking “at the defendant’s conduct, as evidenced by the indictment or 
information, to determine if the conduct itself would have violated a comparable 
Washington statute”). West Virginia follows a similar procedure. See State v. Hulbert, 544 
S.E.2d 919, 926 (W. Va. 2001) (“Given these statutory variances, the factual predicates upon 
which the convictions in Michigan rested must be shown in order to bring the Michigan 
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facts of an offender’s past convictions along with the elements of the crime. 
In People v. McGee,
252
 the California Supreme Court articulated that, in 
order for an out-of-state offense to qualify as a predicate crime, it “must 
involve conduct that would qualify as a serious felony in California.”
253
 
Accordingly, courts are allowed to examine the entire record “to determine 
the nature or basis of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.”
254
  
The California Supreme Court also rejected a strictly elements-based 
approach in People v. Avery.
255
 In a case that is particularly applicable to 
the Taylor-Mathis jurisprudence, the California court had to decide whether 
a defendant’s prior conviction in Texas for “burglary of a habitation with 
intent to commit theft” qualified as a predicate offense for California’s 
habitual-offender statute.
256
 When analyzing the record of conviction, the 
court held that it did not have enough information because “[o]n this 
record . . . we know nothing about the nature of the Texas crime beyond its 
statutory requirements and the fact that the underlying intent was to commit 
theft.”
257
 Somewhat like Georgia,
258
 the Court found that the bare elements 
alone, without any underlying facts, were not enough to determine whether 
the Texas offense should be considered a California predicate because “the 
question is whether a Texas conviction . . . under Texas law necessarily 
involves conduct that would qualify as [the parallel felony] under California 
law.”
259
 In People v. Jones,
260
 the California Court of Appeal similarly held 
that when a comparison of elements left ambiguity, the habitual-offender 
statute did not apply because the record of the previous crime of bank 
robbery did not contain the underlying facts of that conviction.
261
 
This “California Rule,” which places heavy emphasis on a criminal’s 
underlying conduct in tandem with the elements of the prior crime, has 
been followed for over twenty-five years. The rule is driven by common 
sense and “promotes the efficient administration of justice and, specifically, 
                                                                                                                 
convictions within the ambit of the West Virginia statute for enhanced punishment of 
subsequent domestic violence offenses.”).  
 252. 133 P.3d 1054 (Cal. 2006). 
 253. Id. at 1059 (quoting People v. Avery, 38 P.3d 1, 2 (Cal. 2002)).  
 254. Id. (citing People v. Woodell, 950 P.2d 85, 89-93 (Cal. 1998)).  
 255. 38 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2002). 
 256. Id. at 3. 
 257. Id. at 2. 
 258. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.  
 259. Avery, 38 P.3d at 3. 
 260. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 485 (Ct. App. 1999).  
 261. Id. at 497-98. 
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furthers the evident intent of the people in establishing an enhancement . . . 
that refers to conduct, not a specific crime.”
262
  
Of all the state-based approaches, the conduct-based approach is the 
most promising and perhaps the most obvious. As one commentator put it, 
the problems of the categorical approach “seem to be eas[ily] resolve[d] if 
courts could simply look at the facts and determine whether the defendants 
actually engaged in any violent or risky activity.”
263
 Were federal courts to 
follow a conduct-based approach when interpreting the ACCA, this  
straightforward and intuitive approach would not only lead to consistent 
results, but would also save judicial economy. 
In practice, federal judges would no longer have to parse through state 
law and compare the elements of the predicate offense to the generic 
version of the offense, embarking on a complicated procedural journey if 
the elements did not line up perfectly (as they so rarely do). Instead, the 
sentencing judge would merely look to Shepard documents—such as an 
indictment or plea colloquy—to find the conduct on which the defendant’s 
predicate offense was based. Based on this conduct, the judge would be 
able to determine whether the defendant actually committed what would be 
considered a predicate felony under the generic version of a crime, such as 
burglary. For example, in Mathis, if the defendant admitted in his prior plea 
that he in fact burgled a building, and not a boat or airplane, then the 
conduct he committed in Iowa would qualify because it comports with 
generic burglary. In cases where the Shepard documents do not delineate 
the criminal conduct, the government would not be able to meet its burden 
of proof and the ACCA could not apply. This simple and intuitive conduct-
based approach would no doubt streamline ACCA sentencing and cut down 
on the litigation that floods federal criminal dockets.
264
  
The conduct-based approach would also solve the ideological problems 
that plague the current doctrine by ensuring that offenders are punished for 
their conduct and that they do not escape their intended punishment because 
of a legal technicality. At its root, the conduct-based approach comports 
with the justice system’s theory of just deserts, which includes punishing 
offenders for their criminal actions. Thus, the bizarre and nonsensical 
results often bemoaned by judges would decline. No longer would habitual 
                                                                                                                 
 262. People v. Guerrero, 748 P.2d 1150, 1157 (Cal. 1988). 
 263. Powell, supra note 37, at 8; see also Timothy W. Castor, Note, Escaping a Rigid 
Analysis: The Shift to a Fact-Based Approach for Crime of Violence Inquiries Involving 
Escape Offenses, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 345, 362–71 (2004) (proposing that courts 
employ a fact-based approach to analyze escape cases). 
 264. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.  
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offenders—like the burglar and sex-offender in Mathis—escape just 
punishment based on state law not comporting with a generic definition of 
burglary.  
Finally, the conduct-based approach does not result in differentiated 
application based on jurisdiction. Whether a criminal commits an offense in 
Montana or Maine, California or Kentucky, on the West Coast or the East 
Coast, he or she will be judged by his or her actions. If a person burgles a 
building in Kentucky, he or she will be treated the same under the ACCA as 
the offender who burgles a building in California. Even though Kentucky’s 
burglary statute may define and punish burglary differently than in 
California, the technical differences in these states’ penal codes would have 
no bearing on punishment under the ACCA. The conduct-based approach 
does not spend its time in the ivory tower comparing elements, but punishes 
offenders practically based on actual conduct. Thus, no matter the state in 
which the offender committed a predicate offense, the conduct-based 
approach would look at the offender’s conduct alone and determine whether 
it would fulfill the elements of the generic version of the crime. 
Lending further support to this doctrinal change is the fact that the 
modified categorical approach already veers awfully close to a conduct-
based approach. When sentencing courts are instructed to look at charging 
documents and plea colloquies, these courts are necessarily looking at the 
conduct described in these documents in order to discern the set of 
alternative elements under which the defendant was convicted. In Taylor, 
for example, the Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit, which 
looked to the charging documents and ultimately found that the defendant 
burgled a house.
265
 The Court must be able to admit that, for all practical 
purposes, the underlying conduct of a defendant’s past crimes is 
inextricably tied to the elements that the prosecuting authority charges the 
defendant with. The conduct determines the crime that the defendant is 
charged with, and thus the modified categorical approach—which 
supposedly looks only at Shepard documents to determine elements—
necessarily takes conduct into account.
266
  
                                                                                                                 
 265. United States v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 703, 707 (8th Cir. 1991). 
 266. Further, some federal courts have already adopted a conduct-based approach when 
applying other federal habitual-offender statutes. See United States v. Johnson, 479 F. App’x 
811, 819 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that federal three strikes law, 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (2012), 
“unmistakably requires courts to look to the specific facts underlying the prior offense, not 
to the elements of the statute under which the defendant was convicted”) (quoting United 
States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000)); see also United States v. 
Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918, 930 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding that “[a] state drug offense qualifies as 
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1. Apprendi and the Sixth Amendment Do Not Foreclose a Conduct-
Based Approach  
The biggest potential precedential hurdle for the conduct-based 
approach, as the Supreme Court has contemplated, is that it may run afoul 
of Apprendi v. New Jersey,
267
 a case holding that “only a jury, not a judge, 
may find facts that increase a maximum penalty [called for in a statute].”
268
 
Consequently, any fact that can be used to enhance the offender’s sentence 
beyond the statutory maximum must be presented to a jury and proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to the offender’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.
269




 alike have 
shied away from using a conduct-based approach because it would require 
sentencing judges to “find facts” about a habitual offender’s prior criminal 
conduct that could boost his sentence above the statutory maximum.  
Others on the Court, however, have expressed doubt that Apprendi 
“compel[s] the elements based approach.”
272
 In fact, in Justice Breyer’s 
dissent in Mathis, which was joined by Justice Ginsburg, he specifically 
stated his position that Apprendi did not “require the majority’s result” 
because of the practical synonymy of the elements and means of a crime 
when presented to a jury.
273
 When combined with Justices Kennedy and 
Thomas,
274
 at least four of the justices agree that Apprendi either does not 
control in ACCA litigation or otherwise does not preclude a conduct-based 
                                                                                                                 
a ‘serious drug offense’ under § 3559(c) only if the offense, if prosecuted in federal court, 
would have been punishable under [21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)] or [21 U.S.C. § 
960(b)(1)(A)]”). 
 267. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
 268. Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
490); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 601–02 (1990) (anticipating potential 
Sixth Amendment issues presented in Apprendi, and finding that an elements-based 
approach would be safest to prevent potential Sixth Amendment violations). 
 269. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
 270. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2252; Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288–
89 (2013); Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601–02.  
 271. Rebecca Sharpless, Finally, a True Elements Test: Mathis v. United States and the 
Categorical Approach, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 1275, 1295-98 (2012) (arguing that Apprendi 
prevents a purely conduct-based approach).  
 272. Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2258 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 2259 (Thomas, 
J., concurring) (acknowledging that “Apprendi recognized an exception for the ‘fact of a 
prior conviction,’” and stating the position that Apprendi was wrongly decided).  
 273. Id. at 2265 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 274. See supra note 272.  
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approach; given the current composition of the Court, this position may 
soon become the majority.
275
  
The states have also interpreted Apprendi, many finding that its holding 
does not apply to their habitual-offender statutes because Apprendi 
“expressly carved out an exception for prior convictions.”
276
 In other words, 
Apprendi itself stated that prior convictions can be presented to sentencing 
judges to enhance sentences beyond the statutory maximum, and need not 
be presented to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
277
 
In particular, Apprendi carved out this exception for facts of prior 
convictions because “[b]oth the certainty that procedural safeguards 
attached to any ‘fact’ of prior conviction . . . mitigated the due process and 
Sixth Amendment concerns otherwise implicated in allowing a judge to 
determine a ‘fact’ increasing punishment beyond the maximum of the 
statutory range.”
278
 Said another way, the due process that was afforded to 
the offender during the proceedings related to his or her prior offense 
minimizes the possibility of a judge’s erroneous fact-finding during 
sentencing for a subsequent crime. After all, the judge is simply relying on 
the fact of a prior conviction that was adequately protected by the 
procedural safeguards in that prior case.
279
 In addition, the Court has 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Lee, supra note 129, at 270 (positing that the categorical approach’s fate depends 
largely on who was selected to fill the vacancy of the late Justice Antonin Scalia).  Justice 
Scalia has been succeeded by Justice Neal Gorsuch, and the ultimate fate of Apprendi’s 
application and the categorical based approach remains to be seen, as these matters have not 
come before the Court during his short tenure.   
 276. Redd v. State, 635 S.E.2d 870, 871 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006); see also Reed v. State, 121 
A.3d 1234 (Table), 2015 WL 667525 (Del. 2015) (finding that Alleyne v. United States, 133 
S. Ct. 2151 (2013) did not require the fact of a defendant’s prior conviction to be submitted 
to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt); Louisiana v. Juengain, 41 So. 3d 499, 506–07 
(La. Ct. App. 2010) (finding that Apprendi did not require the fact of a defendant’s prior 
convictions to submitted to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt). But see State v. Auld, 
361 P.3d 471, 475 (Haw. 2015) (finding that because Hawaii’s habitual-offender statute 
required more than merely proving the facts of prior convictions to enhance a defendant’s 
sentence, that Apprendi did apply and that these additional facts must be presented to a jury 
to be found beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant can be sentenced as a habitual 
offender).  
 277. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489–90 (2000) (addressing and declining to 
overturn Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) and Almandarez-Torres v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)). 
 278. Id. at 488. 
 279. See In re Pers. Restraint of Lavery, 111 P.3d 837, 842 (Wash. 2005) (holding that 
“[n]o additional safeguards are required” when a judge is basing a sentence on a prior 
conviction “because a certified copy of a prior judgment and sentence is highly reliable 
evidence”).  
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expressed particular concern with regard to allowing a sentencing court to 
“make a disputed determination” about the facts of what the “state judge 
must have understood as the factual basis of the prior plea.”
280
 But such a 
concern is unwarranted in a majority of cases, such as in Mathis, where the 
facts underlying the prior conviction are uncontested and when the plea 
colloquy or sentencing documents contain a clear recitation of stipulated 
facts.  
In McGee, the California Supreme Court wrestled with this issue, 
ultimately finding that Apprendi did not foreclose its conduct-based 
approach to determining predicate offenses.
281
 The court found that there 
was a distinction to be made between “sentence enhancements that require 
fact finding related to the circumstance of the current offense, such as 
whether a defendant acted with the intent necessary to establish a ‘hate 
crime’—a task identified by Apprendi as one for the jury” and the 
distinguishable scenario where a court simply examines “court records 
pertaining to a defendant’s prior conviction to determine the nature or basis 
of the conviction—a task to which Apprendi did not speak and the ‘type of 
inquiry that judges traditionally perform as part of the sentencing 
function.’”
282
 In so holding, the court outlined several cases from other 
states similarly holding that Apprendi did not foreclose a judge from 




                                                                                                                 
 280. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2288 (2013); Shepard v. United States, 
544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005).  
 281. People v. McGee, 133 P.3d 1054, 1071 (Cal. 2006). 
 282. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting People v. Kelii, 981 P.2d 518, 520 (Cal. 1999))t. 
 283. See id. at 1067-69 (citing Wright v. State, 780 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) 
(holding that defendant did not have a right to a jury trial to determine the fact of a prior 
conviction); People v. Hill, 803 N.E.2d 138, 150 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding that there is no 
right to a jury trial on facts relating to recidivism, including “the fact of the timing, degree, 
number and sequence of defendant’s prior convictions,” or “on his age for purpose of 
enhancement under the recidivist sentencing statute”); State v. Stewart, 791 A.2d 143, 151-
52 (Md. 2002) (“[I]n light of the language in Apprendi suggesting that sentencing courts 
traditionally consider matters related to recidivism, courts have found that the Almendarez–
Torres exception to the right to a jury trial is not limited solely to prior convictions.”); State 
v. Dixon 787 A.2d 211, 221 (N.J. 2001) (holding there is no right to a jury trial where “[t]he 
required fact-finding does not relate to the present offense or its elements”) (emphasis 
added); People v. Rosen, 752 N.E.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. 2001) (holding that the “[d]efendant 
had no constitutional right to a jury trial to establish the facts of his prior felony convictions” 
including “matters pertaining to the defendant’s history and character and the nature and 
circumstances of his criminal conduct”)). 
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Michigan’s approach is particularly interesting, holding that Apprendi 
does not apply because the statutory maximum penalty for a habitual 
offender is based on the habitual-offender statute, not on the statute under 
which the actual crime was committed.
284
 Thus, Apprendi’s holding would 
never be triggered since the habitual offender’s sentence would never go 
over the statutory maximum of the habitual-offender statute.  
In short, the Supreme Court’s apprehension that Apprendi requires an 
elements-based approach—and forecloses a conduct-based approach—is 
not justified. Apprendi specifically allows an exception for judges to find 
facts of prior convictions pursuant to habitual-offender statutes. Thus, a 
court need not submit facts of the defendant’s conduct in a prior conviction 
to a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, a judge can rely on 
uncontested evidence in the record of these prior convictions to enhance a 
defendant’s sentence. Therefore, given the unlikely application of Apprendi 
to the ACCA, there is little standing in the way of instituting a conduct-
based approach. 
2. Even if Apprendi Applies, Federal Courts Could Amend Their 
Sentencing Practices to Overcome Any Sixth Amendment Hurdles  
Even if Apprendi or other related cases did present an impediment to the 
conduct-based approach,
285
 many states have circumvented any issues by 
adopting criminal procedures to ensure that a criminal’s status as a habitual 
offender is presented to the jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. By 
combining the conduct-based approach with the procedural method of 
proving past criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt—perhaps in a 
separate proceeding—any Apprendi problem would be avoided because the 
very facts that would enhance a habitual offender’s sentence beyond the 
statutory maximum would be presented to a jury, which would be required 
to confirm these facts beyond a reasonable doubt before the defendant 
could be sentenced as a habitual offender.  
                                                                                                                 
 284. People v. Drohan, 715 N.W.2d 778, 790 (Mich. 2006) (“[T]he statutory maximum 
sentence of a defendant who is convicted of being an habitual offender is as provided in the 
habitual-offender statute, rather than the statute he or she was convicted of offending. 
Apprendi and Blakely specifically allow for an increase in a defendant’s maximum sentence 
on the basis of ‘the fact of a prior conviction . . . .’”) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 
U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).  
 285. See also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155 (2013) (holding that facts 
that increase a mandatory minimum sentence of a crime should be considered and that the 
“element” of the crime must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt).  
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In Indiana, for example (a conduct-based jurisdiction), “habitual offender 
proceedings are treated as substantive criminal trials. The State must prove 
the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.”
286
 While many states treat their 
habitual-offender statutes merely as sentencing enhancements subject to the 
purview of the sentencing judge,
287
 the states that submit these matters to a 
jury extend protections to habitual offenders based on the notion that such 
protections “reflect[] the serious consequences of such a determination.”
288
 
Therefore, “[t]he State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt prior 
convictions alleged for enhancement.”
289
  
While this approach would cure any potential Sixth Amendment issues 
concerning sentence-enhancing facts and their presentation to a jury,
290
 it 
may also prejudice the defendant with regard to his or her current charge. 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Moore v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). 
 287. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1804(a) (West 2013); Smith v. United States, 304 
A.2d 28, 32 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (finding that habitual-offender statute only came into play after 
defendant had been found guilty, and habitual-offender status need not be charged in 
indictment).  
 288. Moore, 769 N.E.2d at 1146. 
 289. Reynolds v. State, 227 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App. 2007); see also Conner v. State, 
138 So. 3d 143, 151 (Miss. 2014) (“At [the habitual sentencing] hearing, the elements in the 
applicable habitual-offender statute must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. 
McClain, 302 P.3d 367, 372 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012) (“The former convictions relied upon to 
invoke the persistent violator enhancement must be alleged in the indictment or information 
and be proved at trial beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. Cooper, 321 S.W.3d 501, 505 
(Tenn. 2010) (“[T]he court must find ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a 
repeat violent offender’ for purpose of sentencing.” (citation omitted)); People v. Nunn, 148 
P.3d 222, 225 (Colo. App. 2006) (“In habitual criminal proceedings, the prosecution bears 
the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has been previously 
convicted as alleged.”); State ex rel. Appleby v. Recht, 583 S.E.2d 800, 808 (W. Va. 2002) 
(holding that the state must prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant’s prior 
predicates were “committed subsequent to each preceding conviction” and that the defendant 
is the person who committed them); Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232, 235 (Ky. 
2000) (“[T]he Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and could not by 
inference or guess work, confer persistent felony status on anyone.”); State v. Sinclair, 439 
A.2d 945, 946 (Conn. 1981) (“The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt the elements essential to establish that the defendant is a persistent felony offender.”); 
State v. Cameron, 227 A.2d 276, 279 (Vt. 1967) (“[I]t becomes the duty of the prosecuting 
officer to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the fact or facts denied. But the guilt or 
innocence of the respondent respecting any former conviction is not an issue.”). 
 290. But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 239–47 (1998) (holding 
that 8 U.S.C. § 1326, a statute that punished recidivists more harshly in the immigration 
context, did not require the government to charge the offender as a recidivist, and that the 
offender’s prior crimes were merely sentencing enhancing factors that were not elements 
that needed to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). 
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At least one state, Michigan, specifically prohibits information of an 
offender’s past crimes from being contained in the indictment and from 
being presented to a jury to prevent these past acts from tainting the jury’s 
finding of guilt on the current charge.
291
 For this same reason, the Federal 
Rules of Evidence prohibit presenting evidence to a jury of a defendant’s 




In an effort to prevent such prejudice, many states that require the fact of 
a prior conviction to be presented to a jury have also adopted a bifurcated 
criminal trial, in which information of the defendant’s past crimes are only 
presented to a jury after the jury has already found the defendant guilty of 
the instant offense.
293
 This bifurcated trial procedure affords defendants 
additional due process and prevents any prejudice that may arise from 
presenting the offender’s prior criminal history during the guilt phase of the 
proceedings. This added process, however, comes at the expense of the time 
of the jury and of judicial resources.  
Adoption of this approach in the federal system may also take on a 
bifurcated trial approach, which would tax judicial economy in the 
relatively small percentage of criminal cases actually go to trial.
294
 In most 
cases under this potential practice, however, a defendant would be 
presented with an indictment that would note their prior convictions and the 
government’s intent to prove that the offender is an armed career criminal 
under the ACCA. This additional charge would then be a part of the plea 
bargaining process, and many defendants may concede such charge, while 
others may negotiate this charge away through the bargaining process. 
Thus, judicial economy would not be unnecessarily taxed, since so few 
federal criminal cases actually go to trial;
295
 however, the approach would 
save enormous amounts of time and judicial resources by ensuring a simple 
                                                                                                                 
 291. People v. Everson, 168 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969).  
 292. See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 293. See, e.g., Davis v. State, 680 So. 2d 843, 851 (Miss. 1996) (holding that a 
sentencing hearing must be separate from trial on the principle charge, but the facts at the 
sentencing hearing still must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). Indiana also separates 
the indictment into separate documents. Lawrence v. State, 286 N.E.2d 830, 835 (Ind. 1972) 
(“In the first the particular offense with which the accused is charged should be set forth, and 
this should be upon the first page of the information and signed by the prosecuting officer. In 
the second part former convictions should be alleged, and this should be upon the second 
page of the information, separable from the first page and signed by the prosecuting 
officer.”).  
 294. See supra note 22–24. 
 295. Id. 
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conduct-based approach that protects offenders’ Sixth Amendment rights 
by presenting facts of prior convictions to a jury if necessary. 
3. Other Potential Roadblocks of Judicial Fact-finding and Plea 
Agreements Are Easily Overcome 
Apart from potential Sixth Amendment issues, the Court has also 
forwarded other supposed hurdles to adopting a conduct-based approach 
that, upon further examination, are not significant enough to outweigh the 
substantial benefits of the conduct-based approach.  
One interesting argument the Court has returned to several times is the 
“daunting difficulties” of applying a conduct-based approach, including the 
taxation of judicial economy and difficulty for the government to “expend 
resources examining (often aged) documents for evidence that a defendant 
admitted in a plea colloquy, or a prosecutor showed at trial, facts that, 
although unnecessary to the crime of conviction, satisfy an element of the 
relevant generic offense.”
296
 The Court’s concerns over judicial economy 
are simply unfounded. If current experience is any indication, it seems like 
any change to the categorical approach would reap benefits for the courts’ 
resources.
297
 The judicial fact-finding required by the conduct-based 
approach would not require extensive mini-trials or significant digging into 
antiquated records but would merely be an extension of the modified 
categorical approach. Plea colloquies, jury instructions, jury forms, and 
other approved documents that show uncontested facts or facts found 
beyond a reasonable doubt would suffice. If the government could not meet 
its burden to produce such records sufficient for the court to make such a 
factual determination of the conduct of the predicate offenses, the ACCA 
would not apply. This logical repurposing of the modified categorical 
approach is painless and is already in line with what many courts, in 
practice, are currently doing.
298
  
Along a similar vein, the Court has also argued against a conduct-based 
approach by noting it would be unfair to habitual offenders if their prior 
predicate offenses were the result of plea deals for which they pleaded to a 
lower offense. For example, “if a guilty plea to a lesser, nonburglary 
offense was the result of a plea bargain, it would seem unfair to impose a 
sentence enhancement as if the defendant had pleaded guilty to burglary” 
based on the underlying facts of the actual burglary that was committed.
299
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Thus, as the Court reasoned, “a later sentencing court could still treat the 
defendant as though he had pleaded to an ACCA predicate, based on legally 
extraneous statements found in the old record.”
300
 While this concern has 
merit due to the incredibly high percentage of criminal cases that are 
resolved through plea deals,
301
 it nevertheless flouts the spirit of the ACCA, 
which is to increase punishment for habitual offenders.  
From an ideological standpoint, if the goal of habitual-offender laws is to 
protect the public by incapacitating offenders who have failed multiple 
attempts at rehabilitation, sentencing courts should indeed be able to look to 
the past conduct of the predicate crimes. Courts should not be hamstrung by 
yet another legal technicality such as the deal struck by the government to 
punish the offender for a lesser crime.  
From a practical standpoint, this supposed plea-bargaining problem is 
easily remedied. For one, state and federal sentencing courts can advise 
defendants who are entering pleas of the potential consequences that the 
facts admitted in the plea colloquy could be used at a future date to serve as 
a predicate to a state or federal habitual-offender statute. It is already 
common practice for sentencing judges to thoroughly examine defendants 
entering pleas on the record and inform them of their rights;
302
 an added 
practice of informing defendants of potential sentencing consequences 
down the road is already in line with current practice.  
Second, state and federal prosecutors should be incentivized to notify 
defendants of the potential future sentencing ramifications to admitting 
certain facts in their plea deal. As part of the plea deal contract,
303
 
defendants should be able to negotiate and admit the appropriate facts if the 
plea deal contains notice that these facts could be used against them in the 
future if they are deemed to be habitual offenders.  
Last, criminal defense attorneys should advise their clients of the 
potential future ramifications. The Court has already required defense 
attorneys to advise defendants entering pleas of potential future 
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immigration consequences (such as pleading to a crime that could later be 
considered a crime of moral turpitude that would disqualify the immigrant 
from various forms of relief from deportation),
304
 so extending this rule to 
the potential future habitual sentencing consequences is not an unwarranted 
or cumbersome expansion of current doctrine. It is possible that these 
notification safeguards—by the judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel—
may also have the unintended consequence of decreasing the willingness of 
defendants to take a plea deal and plead guilty if such a plea could entail 
such serious consequences. This is unlikely, though, since many repeat 
offenders will likely be overconfident that they will either not commit a 
crime again, or at least not be caught again.  
VI. Conclusion 
“It has been said that the life of the law is experience.”  
-- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2560 (2015). 
Based on the experience of the past twenty-five years of applying the 
categorical approach, the life of the ACCA has been a disappointment. The 
categorical approach as has proved to be a failed experiment in legal fiction 
that nonsensically punishes habitual offenders based on the statutory 
elements of prior offenses rather than the conduct of their those offenses. 
The problem with such legal fiction is that the further down the rabbit hole 
you go, the further divorced the fiction becomes from reality. With 
Congress sitting on the sideline and with little indication of future action,
305
 
the judiciary must act to solve the practical, ideological, and organizational 
problems of the current doctrine.  
The states have addressed this problem with much more success by 
instituting simpler and more efficient approaches based on the practical 
realities of criminal sentencing. Foremost among these approaches is a 
clear, conduct-based approach that returns to reality by punishing habitual 
offenders based on the consideration of the criminal conduct of their prior 
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crimes. This solution comports with the federal goals of treating like 
offenders alike no matter where they committed their predicate crime 
because; unlike the current elements-based categorical approach, conduct is 
not dependent on state statutes. The conduct-based approach would also be 
far more efficient than the current doctrine because sentencing judges 
would not have to spend time parsing through state law; rather, they would 
need only rely on Shepard documents that convey the criminal conduct of 
the prior crime to determine if such conduct fits within the generic 
definition of the enumerated crimes in the ACCA. Unfortunately, the 
current Court seems determined to keep facts out of the equation and 
continues to cling to the unworkable categorical approach.  
The future of the ACCA is impossible to predict, but its current path is 
precarious. The Court recently declared the ACCA’s residual clause—
which applied the ACCA to any crime that “otherwise involves conduct 
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”
306
—
unconstitutionally vague in Johnson v. United States after wrestling with 
inconsistent applications after only nine years and a handful of cases.
307
 
During this short time period, justices bemoaned that the Court’s approach 
to deciphering the residual clause was unworkable due to inconsistencies
308
 
and the lack of any definite standards to determine predicate crimes in light 
of the clause’s broad strokes.
309
 This resulted in years of circuit splits, 
plaguing the residual clause’s application in the courts of appeals.
310
 
Finally, the Court abandoned nearly a decade of precedent and found its 
attempts to decipher the confusing language so devoid of applicable 
standards that the clause was ultimately unconstitutionally vague.
311
 After 
twenty-five years of circuit splits and inconsistent application of the 
categorical approach as it applies to enumerated crimes like burglary, the 
Court may be willing to pull the trigger and declare this portion of the 
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ACCA unconstitutionally vague as well given the continued inconsistency 
and unworkability of the categorical approach.
312
  
Given Congress’s inaction over the past quarter century, even when the 
architect of the ACCA himself lamented the Court’s approach,
313
 the Court 
is likely embarking on its own policy-making venture. This muddled 
doctrine may indeed be the Court’s way of acting consistently with 
Congress’s current intent to start dismantling the injurious vestiges of mass 
incarceration and mete out a measured justice that has been missing from 
federal sentencing for many decades. Such is the extent of the damage to 
the categorical approach—it has become so unsound that the only thing that 
makes sense any more is that the Court is maneuvering to dismantle it piece 
by piece. Whatever the case may be, the categorical approach is 
unsustainable from a doctrinal standpoint, and the Court must move to 
remedy the problems of the doctrine if it seeks to institute a morally 
responsible, efficient, and efficacious approach to punishing habitual 
offenders. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 312. Thus, the premium that the Court placed on precedent in Mathis could easily be 
overridden given the continued practical difficulties of the categorical approach. See Mathis 
v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2257 (2016).  
 313. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol70/iss3/3
